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It's Nothing Personal: The Public Costs of
Limited Liability Law Partnerships
N. ScoTT MURPHY*
"[T]he actions of a partner you don't even know, working in an office on the other side
of the country, could cost you your house and force your kids to go to public school."'
"It's a partner's worst nightmare: Her fellow partner has been accused of malpractice..
. . The firm's malpractice insurance won't cover the claim. The firm's assets won't cover
the claim. Soon the feds will be coming after the partners' personal assets. Soon the feds
will be coming after her house, her boat, her Lichtenstein hanging on the wall.
' 2
INTRODUCTION
Terror at the prospects of public school for one's kids and losing a pricey piece of art
sounds more like material for a lawyer joke than grounds for legislative action. But
statehouses around the nation are treating such horrors as a mandate to rewrite the book
on partnership liability, and with it the rules governing the American law firm.
The limited liability partnership ("LLP") or registered limited liability partnership
("RLLP"), as it is known in some states, demonstrates the most radical departure yet from
traditional notions of member liability for law partnerships.3 In the past, the
overwhelming majority of law firms operated as general partnerships, entailing unlimited
liability for all partners. This made each partner in a firm personally liable for the
malpractice of the firm's other partners, even malpractice of which the partner was
unaware.
4
The LLP allows a law firm to obtain limited liability, which lets firm partners avoid
much of the personal exposure to malpractice claims against their colleagues which came
with the territory of traditional law partnerships. Not only do LLPs offer limited liability,
they offer it without losing pass-through taxation for the firm, and without noticeable
changes to the partnership's structure or operation. Thus LLPs offer law firms a number
of advantages not available with other enterprise forms.5
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; BJ., 1993, University of Missouri-
Columbia. I thank Professor Alysa C. Rollock for her guidance and constructive comments on earlier drafts of this Note.
I also thank Professor Roger B. Dworkin for advising my formulation and research of the tort law principles contained
in this Note. Finally, I thank my parents, Russell N. and Scarlett Y. Murphy, for their love and support, and my lady, Stacy
E. Notaras, for her grace, guidance, and love throughout my work.
1. Michael Orey, The Lessons ofKaye, Scholer Am 1My Parner's Keeper?, AM. LAW., May 1992, at 3, 81.
2. Thorn Weidlich, Liniting Lawyers 'Liability: LLPs Can Protect Assets ofInnocent Partners, NAT'L LJ., Feb.
7,1994, at 1.
3. Edward A. Adams, Firms Expected to Make Switch to New Format: Limited Liability Partnerships See
Restricting Exposure, N.Y. LJ., July 14,1994, at 1.
4.a 
5. These forms include the general partnership, the limited partnership, the professional corporation, the traditional
C corporation, and, most recently, the limited liability company (1LCe"). See infra part I.C.
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Available in eighteen states and the District of Columbia,6 the LLP is the upstart
sibling of the limited liability company ("LLC"), now available in all but a handful of
jurisdictions.7 LLP statutes have not yet been tested in court,' but they have won legions
of supporters among the American bar and media, who trumpet the LLP as a long-
overdue protection for "innocent" law partners.' Similarly, legal scholars have given
substantial consideration to the LLP as a positive opportunity for law firms."
6. As of Janurary 1, 1995, eighteen states and the District of Columbia had enacted LLP statutes. The following
are the statutory sections describing the nature of a partner's liability in a limited liability partnership: ARZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 29-215 (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 34-53 (1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515 (Supp.
199.4);19. CODE ANN. § 41-146 (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, pars. 205/15 (Smith-Hurd 1995); IOWA CODE § 486.15
(1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-315 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 362.220 (1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3431 (West
Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9-307 (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14 (West 1995); N.Y.
PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-45 (Supp. 1994); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §
1775.14 (Anderson Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-370 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6132b, § 3.08 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-1-46 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 50-15 (Michie
1994). For a convenient compilation of full-text LLP statutes, see Limited Liability Partnership Statutes, in 12 STATE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP LAWS (Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J. Jacobson eds., 1995).
7. Forty-six states and the District of Columbia had passed LLC statutes as of January 1, 1995. LLC laws have been
proposed in the remaining four states: Hawaii, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. For a convenient collection
of full-text LLC statutes, see LimitedLiability Company Statutes, in 8-11 STATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP LAWS, supra note
6.
8. Christi Harlan, Texas andLoulsiana Move to ShieldPersonal Assets of Law-Firm Partners, WALL ST. J., Mar.
13, 1992, at A4; Weidlich, supra note 2, at 1.
Courts have addressed, with mixed results, the issue of whether professional corporation statutes, which offer limited
liability for shareholders, may properly extend similar protection to lawyers for their co-partner's malpractice. See First
Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 302 S.E.2d 674, 675 (Ga. 1983) ("However, there is no clear authority enunciating whether
such a limitation of liability exists for a professional corporation organized for the purpose of practicing the legal
profession."). The Georgia Supreme Court in Zagoria also stated:
By enacting the professional corporation statute the legislature performed a useful and constitutional act.
A professional corporation has numerous legitimate business purposes. By conducting a law practice
through the structure of a professional corporation, its shareholders realize the advantages of more orderly
business operations, greater ease in acquiring, holding and transferring property, and more continuity of
its existence. Additionally, a professional corporation affords to its shareholders insulation against
liability for obligations which do not arise as a result of a breach of a lawyer's obligation to his client or
an act of professional malpractice. The shareholders of a professional corporation have the same
insulation from liability as shareholders of other corporations with respect to obligations of a purely
business and nonprofessional nature. However, the influence of the statute upon the professional
corporation cannot extend to the regulation of the law practice so as to impose a limitation of liability for
acts of malpractice or obligations incurred because of a breach of a duty to a client.
Id..
9. Weidlich, supa note 2, at 1, 38;see also Harlan, supra note 8, atA4 ("The Louisiana law 'was designed to put
some sanity back into these lawsuits' against bank and thrift advisers, says David Willenzik, a New Orleans lawyer who
helped draft it.") (citations omitted); Lisa Isom-Rodriguez, Limiting the Perils of Partnership, Am. LAW., July-Aug. 1993,
at 30. Specifically, Isom-Rodriguez said:
These days big-firm partners are looking to registered limited liability partnerships . ..with an
enthusiasm perhaps more appropriately reserved for the Holy Grail, says Michael Bohnen, a partner at
Boston's 117-lawyer Nutter, McClennen & Fish, who has written an LLP bill that is pending in the
Massachusetts legislature. The Grail may have promised the ultimate wisdom, but LLPs ... promise to
protect a partner's personal assets from claims leveled against another partner down the hall, or on the
other side of the world.
Id.
10. See W. Philip Clinton & Douglas N. Currault II, The Birth of Two Business Entities: LitnitedLiability Companies
and Registered Limited Liability Partnerships, 40 LA. B.J. 289, 292 (1992) ("[C]learly Louisiana attoreys must now
consider the LLC and RLLP whenever advising clients starting a business or reconsidering their original choice of business
format.'); Terrence A. Oved, New York State Limited Liability Partnerships, N.Y. ST. B.J., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 38, 73
(noting advantages of LLPs and predicting that LLPs will "surface as the dominant form of organization for
professionals'); Brian L. Schorr & Sylvia Wang, Limited Liability Company Law. Part Two, N.Y. L.J., July 14, 1994, at
1, 4 ("New York's law should prove to be an attractive statute for organizing an LLC or a professional LLP.'); A Report
to the Illinois Supreme Court Rules Committee by the Chicago Bar Association: Eliminate the Vicarious Liability of
Attorneys, CBA REC., Sept. 1994, at 24.
Similar praise has been given to the limited liability company. See. e.g., Curt C. Brewer IV, North Carolina's Limited
Liability Company Act: A Legislative Mandate for Professional LimitedLiability, 29 WAKE FORESTL. REV. 857 (1994);
David L. Cameron, Strike Up the Band: The LifnitedLiability Company Comes to Oregon, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 291
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While most authors have praised the LLP, little attention has been paid to the negative
implications of law firms using LLP statutes." This Note fans the neglected ember of
cautionary scholarship on the LLP law firm, specifically in the area of legal malpractice.
Using tort law principles of deterrence, loss prevention, and loss spreading, it argues that
law firms, by converting from general partnerships to LLPs, will foster legal malpractice,
transfer malpractice risk to inefficient loss preventors, and transfer malpractice costs to
inefficient loss spreaders. For simplicity's sake, this Note uses various model acts, as well
as the Texas Revised Limited Liability Partnership Act, as references.'
2
This Note consists of four parts. Part I sets forth concepts helpful to the understanding
of LLPs, including (a) the basic characteristics of the LLP as compared to other enterprise
forms, (b) the history behind LLP statutes, and (c) the advantages likely to make LLPs
more attractive to lav firms than other enterprise forms. Parts II, III, and IV set forth
three societal costs implicated in allowing use of the LLP form by law firms. Part II
argues that LLPs will breed malpractice by discouraging lawyers from co-monitoring.
Part III argues that the LLP, by shifting the cost of underinsured legal malpractice from
firms to clients, will force clients to act as malpractice watchdogs, a role for which they
are ill-equipped. Part IV argues that the LLP, by shifting the cost of underinsured legal
malpractice from firm partners to clients, will impede the efficient spreading of
malpractice costs.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE LLP LAW FIRM
This Part explains basic concepts necessary to understand LLPs and their appeal to law
firms. It approaches this task from a definitional, historical, and comparative angle. Part
I.A. presents the basic characteristics of the LLP, focusing heavily on the characteristic
of limited liability and its appeal to law firms. Part I.B. traces the history behind the
(1994); Robert E. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 BUS. LAW. 375
(1992) ("There is no question that LLCs can fill an important gap as an alternative business form."); Demetrios P.
Koutrodimos, LLCs Can Protect Members andProvide Flexible Operations, 52 TAX'N FOR AcCT. 30 (1994); Jimmy G.
McLaughlin, The Limited Liability Company: A Prime Choice for Professionals, 45 ALA. L. REV. 231 (1993); Larry E.
Ribstein, The Deregulation ofLimitedLiability andthe Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 473 (1992) (arguing
that "the partnership form has been preserved by legal rules that make limited liability costly" and that "lt]hese rules are
normatively unjustified"); David C. Worrell & Marci A. Reddick, The Indiana Business Flexibility Act (LimitedLiability
Companies), 27 IND. L. REV. 919 (1994).
11. For one exception, see Thomas A. Denker, Lawyers and Limited Liability for Arizona's Professionals:
Deliverance or Damnation?, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 355 (1995).
12. Acts referred to in this Note include: TEx.REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995);
UNIF. PARTNERsHIP Acr (1994); UNIF. PARTNERSP ACT (1914); UNIF. LTD. PARTNERsHI' ACT (1985); REVISED
MODEL BUStNESs CORP. ACT (1984); REVISED MODELPROFESSIONAL CORP. ACT (1984); Draft Unif. Ltd. Liability Co.
Act (1993) reprinted in 8 STATE LDlrITED PARTNERSHIP LAWS, supra note 6.
In 1992, theNational Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted a new Uniform Partnership Act
commonly referred to as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. In 1994, they made further changes and the name of the
Act became the Uniform Partnership Act (1994). This 1994 Act is still referred to as the Revised Uniform Partnership Act.
See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1994) (historical notes).
Note that unlike the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act for LLCs, no formal model limited liability partnership
act has been promulgated for LLPs. The Texas Act was selected for reference in this Note because Texas was the first state
to enact a registered limited liability partnership act. Many states which have enacted or which are in the process of
enacting LLP statutes have patterned their statutes after the Texas Act. Texas also is the first state to receive a private letter
ruling ftom the IRS granting its state's LLPs partnership status for tax purposes. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-29-016 (Apr. 16,
1992); Weidlich, supra note 2, at 1.
Other statutes which promise to be influential include New York's LLP act. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26 (McKinney
Supp. 1995); see Schorr & Wang, supra note 10, at 1, 4 ("[New York's law] may well be considered a 'model' LLC and
LLP statute. It reflects some of the most current thinking on the subject and provides an LLC's or a professional LLP's
organizers with a package of features and options not yet available in other state statutes.").
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American law firm's rendezvous with the LLP, demonstrating the philosophic
metamorphosis of many firms from a traditionalist distaste for nonpartnership status to
their present exodus to the LLP "promised land." Part I.C. attempts to explain why so
many more law firms are choosing to adopt the LLP form, given their past rejection of
other nonpartnership forms.
A. Characteristics of the LLP
Though LLP statutes in those states which have passed them differ, common
characteristics exist which may be illustrated through examination of the first LLP statute
ever passed, the Texas Registered LLP Act. This Part focuses primarily on the LLP's
attribute of limited liability. Limited liability means that an enterprise member, merely
by virtue of her membership, will not be held personally liable for acts of the enterprise
(including acts of other enterprise members), beyond the amount of her individual
investment. 3 In contrast, unlimited liability means that a member of an enterprise,' 4 by
virtue of her membership, is personally liable for the acts of the enterprise, including acts
of other enterprise members taken within the context of the enterprise's operation. 5
Texas allows any enterprise presently existing as a general partnership 6 to be
registered as an LLP by its members. Attainment of LLP status requires miniscule
procedures under the Texas Act. A general partnership can transfer to the LLP form by
merely filing an application with the Secretary of State containing the partnership's
name, its address, number of partners and an "in-brief' description of the partnership
business, along with a payment of $200 per partner and proof of firm ownership of a
malpractice insurance policy over $100,000. " The Texas Act requires no further action,
though the LLPs must update their registration annually through renewal filings.
13. The classic example is the limited liability afforded to a shareholder ofa large publicly held corporation. Suppose
A owns 10 shares of General Motors stock, for which A paid $100. A GM automobile assembly line worker negligently
overlooks an engine defect which later causes the engine to explode and injure the owner. While GM's corporate assets
may very well be subject to a substantial tort claim by the car owner, the individual GM stockholder will lose no more than
his original $100 investment. As an example, see Stewart v. Coffinan, 748 P.2d 579, 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
("[S]hareholder insulation from such liability has been a cornerstone of corporate law in the United States since the
nineteenth century. Virtually every state has a statute... which limits a shareholder's liability to the cost of the shares
held.") (footnote omitted in original); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. Cmt. L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1985).
14. "Enterprise" is used in this Note as a catch-all phrase to indicate all of the various entities or collectives
recognized by law. Liability for a member of one type of enterprise, such as a partnership (members are commonly called
"partners"), depending on the law of the relevant jurisdiction, may ormay not differ from liability for a member of another
type of enterprise, such as a limited partnership (general partners and/or limited partners), corporation (shareholders), LLC
(shareholders), or LLP (partners).
15. The classic example is the unlimited liability ofparters in a traditional general partnership law finm. Suppose
A, a probate attorney and partner in XYZ law finn, takes a day off from work. That same day, B, a products liability
lawyer and also partner in XYZ, forgets.to file an appeal to a $120 million judgment against XYZ client Willy
Pharmaceuticals for heart problems developed by a group of plaintiffs after 20 years of using a prescription drug
engineered by Willy. Willy sues XYZ and demonstrates that an error by the trial court would have won the case for Willy
on appeal, earning Willy a $120 million malpractice judgment. XYZ's malpractice insurance policy allows maximum
recovery of $100 million. B's personal assets are worth $5 million. The law of partnership requires A, and all other XYZ
partners, to pay the rest out of their personal assets.
Recent cases recognizing unlimited liability for partners in general partnerships are common. Eg., Georgou v. Fritzhall,
145 B.R. 36, 36-37 (Bankr. N.D. IIl. 1992); Bank ofDenver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 763 F. Supp. 1552, 1560 (D.
Colo. 1991); McVaney v. Baird, 466 N.W.2d 499, 501, 506 (Neb. 1991); Clients' Sec. Fund of N.Y. v. Grsdeau, 526
N.E.2d 270, 273 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Roach v. Mead, 722 P.2d 1229 (Or. 1986).
16. See infra part I.C.1 (examining the characteristics of the general partnership).
17. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 10.03.
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In exchange for the LLP's conformance with its registration requirements, Texas grants
an LLP's members limited liability. The Texas LLP Act reads in part as follows:
(a) Liability of Partner.
(1) A partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not individually liable for
debts and obligations of the partnership arising from errors, omissions, negligence,
incompetence, or malfeasance committed while the partnership is a registered limited
liability partnership and in the course of the partnership business by another partner or
a representative of the partnership not working under the supervision or direction of the
first partner unless the first partner:
(A) was directly involved in the specific activity in which the errors, omissions,
negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance were committed by the other partner or
representative; or
(B) had notice or knowledge of the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or
malfeasance by the other partner or representative at the time of occurrence and then
failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or cure the errors, omissions, negligence,
incompetence, or malfeasance.' s
The Texas Act thus grants each partner personal immunity from liability for obligations
of their partnership which arise from the errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or
malfeasance of her co-partners unless that partner participated in or supervised the
malpractice.' In other words, the Texas Act grants partnership members limited liability.
Limited liability is an appealing attribute to law firm partners for several reasons. First,
self-interest leads firm partners who are assumedly risk-adverse to seek out methods to
reduce risk of personal loss,2" and the Texas Act offers one way to reduce this risk.
Second, scholars and the media continue to report the increasing size and frequency of
malpractice claims and judgments, leading many partners to feel a need to further insulate
their personal assets.2' Third, the increasing size of firms and specialization within them
have led more firm partners to view their personal risk as higher with so many partners
acting as agents for their firm.
2
B. History of the LLP Law Firm
For centuries, lawyers were unable to obtain limited liability. One author examined the
changing tid, that came near the middle of the 20th century.
Prior to the 1960's, no state allowed professionals to incorporate. Therefore, all
professionals, including lawyers, worked under the broad personal-liability rules
governing partnerships and sole proprietorships.
Resistance to allowing attorneys in particular to practice in the corporate form was
based upon two general types of concerns: (1) the possibility that the corporation itself
might interfere with the professional relationship between each client and the attorney
handling his case, and (2) the possibility that lawyers could avoid malpractice liability.
However, these "traditional" concerns over the ethical implications of allowing lawyers
to incorporate got pushed aside in the 1960's and 1970's, as other considerations
18. Id.
19. As a general rule, a lawyer would violate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct if she attempted to contract
with a client to limit her personal liability for her own acts of malpractice. See MODEL RULZS OF PROFESSIONAL
CoNDucr Rule 1.8(h) (1994).
20. See STEvEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AccmaDNr LAW 206-08 (1987).
21. See, e.g., Denker, supra note 11, at 359; Manuel L Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Difty Little
Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657,1658-81 (1994).
22. SUSAN SAMUELSON, LAW FIRM MANAGEMENT: A BUSINESS APPROACH § 8.2, at 8:17-8:23 (1994) (detailing
sharp growth in size of and specialization within law firms); Adams, supra note 3, at 1; Weidlich, supra note 2, at 1, 38.
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prompted professionals to lobby state courts and legislatures for the right to incorporate.
The right to enjoy limited liability was not the only advantage which professionals
stood to gain from being allowed to practice in the corporate form; other benefits also
attended the act of incorporation. The most significant of these benefits was the lenient
tax treatment [of qualified corporate retirement plans] which corporations received, and
it was the desire to allow professionals to take advantage of these tax benefits which led
states to permit professional incorporation. Today, every American jurisdiction provides
for the incorporation of professionals.
2 3
Despite the advent of professional corporation statutes, the vast majority of law firms
remained in the general partnership realm.24 Then, in the early 1980's, Congress answered
then-President Ronald Reagan's call for large-scale tax reform by passing the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 and the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982Y
To the partnership's benefit, these two acts equalized the tax treatment of corporations
and partnerships. 6 With favorable tax treatment no longer a motivation for incorporation,
limited liability remained the only significant benefit to forming a professional
corporation.
Meanwhile, the IRS was poised to change its long-standing approach to classifying
entities for federal tax purposes. In the past, the IRS had classified entities with limited
liability for all members as a corporation for tax purposes.27 The IRS' classification of
limited liability business structures as corporations meant that all income earned by the
business was taxed twice, once at the "entity" level and again at the shareholder level.
2 8
Income of partnerships, on the other hand,"was not taxed at the "entity" level. 29 As a
result, along with fees and filings and the annoyance of owner-manager corporate role-
playing,3" double taxation was another price to be paid for limited liability.
An opportunity for the IRS to revise its approach came with the LLC. Born in Germany
and with long-established acceptance throughout Europe and Latin America, LLC statutes
began to emerge in the United States in the mid-1980's.2 t In 1986, only two states,
23. Denker, supra note 11, at 358 (citations omitted).
24. See SAMUELSON, supra note 22, § 2.2.4, at 2:11 ("Despite the substantial advantages of incorporation, only 19
of the 250 largest law firms have incorporated their practices."); Oved, supra note 10, at 38 ("Historically, general
partnerships have been the preferred form utilized by most law firms.").
25. Economic Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26 U.S.C.); Tax.Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
26. Denker, supra note 11, at 359.
27. Keatinge, supra note 10, at 382-83.
28. CL tREM. DicKERsoN,PARTNERsH LAwvADvtsER 9 (1991). This principle is commonly known as "double
taxation."
29. Professors Cary and Eisenberg state:
The critical [taxation] difference between corporate and partnership taxation is that a corporation is
normally taxed as an entity while a partnership is not .... [P]artnership income is treated on a conduit
basis .... [l]neome is treated as if it had been personal income realized by the partners as individuals,
not to the partnership as a separate entity.
WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 95 (6th ed. 1988); see also
DICKERSON, supra note 28, at 9.
30. Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrine to LimitedLiability Companies, 55 MONT.
L. REV. 43,50 (1994) ("Owners of closely owned businesses often regard the formality required by business organization
statutes as unnecessary red tape or as 'Mickey Mouse' requirements imposed by the government."); Isom-Rodriguez,
supra note 9, at 30, 32.
31. For a history of LLC statutes outside the United States, see Ervin 0. Anderson, Government Policies andLegal
Factors, in JoINTINTERNATONALBUSINEss VENTUAES 214,216-17 (Wolfgang G. Friedman & George Kalmanoffeds.,
1961).
For a more expansive discussion of the history, purpose, and predicted effects of LLC statutes in the United States, see
Keatinge, supra note 10, and McLaughlin, supra note 10.
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Wyoming and Florida, had passed statutes recognizing such entities, without much
attention paid by the rest of the nation.32 At first, the IRS balked at the limited liability
aspect of the LLC, promising to deny it partnership classification, and with that, close the
door to conduit-entity taxation: "The Internal Revenue Service believes that the term
'partnership' can apply only to an organization some member of which is personally
liable under applicable local law for debts of the organization. Since a limited liability
company does not satisfy this condition, it cannot be classified as a partnership."33
But in 1988, the IRS classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for tax purposes,
despite the presence of limited liability for members.34 The IRS' modem approach to
taxing various business entities was recently explained:
The unincorporated organization will be taxed as a corporation if it has more
corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics. The characteristics
considered by the IRS as indicative of corporate status are: "(i) associates, (ii) an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity of life, (iv)
centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate
property, and (vi) free transferability of interests."
The first two characteristics, associates and an objective to carry on business and
divide the gains, are common to both partnerships and corporations; therefore, these
characteristics do not enter into the analysis. The IRS considers the presence of the four
remaining characteristics of continuity of life, centralization of management, limited
liability, and free transferability of interests in determining whether an LLC is classified
as a corporation or a partnership. Consequently, practitioners must be certain that a
newly created LLC has more noncorporate than corporate characteristics."
Suddenly, under the IRS' new approach, double taxation was no longer a "cost" of
limited liability.3" Law firms could now obtain limited liability and conduit taxation by
complying with LLC statutes.
By mid-1995, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia had adopted LLC
statutes.37 Though LLC supporters touted their statutes as crucial to fostering business
growth,3 it would not be the next budding Henry Ford or Bill Gates in need of venture
32. Wayne M. Gazur&Neil M. Goff, Assessing the LimitedLiability Company, 41 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 387, 389-
91 (1991). Wyoming enacted the first LLC statute in 1977. WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15.102 (1995); Ribstein, supra note 10,
at 425. Florida followed in 1982. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608A01-.416 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); McLaughlin, supra
note 10, at 231.
33. Classification of Limited Liability Companies: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (1980) (to
be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 301) (proposed Nov. 17, 4980).
34. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
35. C. Timothy Spainhour, Note, LimitedLiability Companies in Arkansas: The Knowns and Unknowns, 16 U. ARK.
LnTrLE RoCK LJ. 27, 35 (1994) (citations omitted) (quoting Gary Schwarcz & Aaron H. Sherbin, The LimitedLiability
Company: A New EntlyforMchigan Businesses?, 71 MsCH. BJ. 650, 652 (1992)); see also Keatinge, supra note 10, at
382-83 (explaining IRS' traditional tax classification of limited liability entities as corporations).
36. The Draft Uniform Limited Liability Company Act states:
§ 304. Liability to Third Parties.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this [Act], the debts, obligations, and liabilities of a limited liability
company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations and
liabilities of the limited liability company. A member or manager of a limited liability company shall not
be obligated personally for any such debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability company solely
by reason of being a member or acting as a manager of a limited liability company.
Draft Unif. Ltd. Liability Co. Act § 304(a) (1993), reprinted in 8-11 STATE LIMITED PARTNER HiP LAWS, supra note 6;
see also Bahls, supra note 30, at 52-53 (discussing LLC's as resolution to entity-seeking dilemma).
37. For a convenient collection of full-text LLC statutes, see Limited Liability Company Statutes, in 8-11 STATE
LImTED PARTNERSHIP LAWS, supra note 6.
38. See Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, States Are Sanctioning New Form of Business, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1992, at B I
('In creating LLCs, legislators are aiming to please business owners concerned about liability and hoping to attract new
business to their states.").
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capital who took advantage of LLC statutes." Rather, much of the response to LLC
statutes came from professional organizations, including law firms seeking reduced
liability.4 The fact that law firms were among the businesses that most utilized the LLC
.was particularly ironic, as few would argue that law firms had any growth difficulties
during the prior two decades. 4' Nonetheless, law firm adoption of the LLC form appeared
somewhat similar to law firm adoption of the professional corporation form: by mid-
1995, more than four hundred law firms nationwide had become LLCs. 42
In the midst of the wildfire adoption of LLC statutes, Texas quietly took the LLC
concept one step further in 1991, by passing the Registered Limited Liability Partnership
Act along with an LLC statute. 43 Soon thereafter, the IRS made a private letter ruling
stating that Texas LLPs would be taxed as partnerships.4 4 LLP statutes caught on in a
manner similar to LLC statutes; by January 1995 they were available in eighteen states
and the District of Columbia.45 Law firm adoption of the LLP form appears to have taken
the wind out of law firms' attraction to the LLC. For example since the LLP's emergence
in Texas, more than five hundred Texas law firms have adopted the form, while
practically no Texas law firms have adopted the LLC form. 46
C. Appeal of the LLP Form to Law Firms
The LLP form offers advantages over alternative limited liability structures available
to law firms in the past. As discussed below, these alternative forms present
disadvantages that prevented most firms from abandoning the partnership form earlier,
while the LLP promises to lead many more firms away from the partnership form in
pursuit of limited liability.
39. See Peter Blackman, LimitedLiability Option: Experts Weigh the Pros and Cons of Converting, N.Y. LJ., Aug.
25, 1994, at 5, 5 ("No one expects there to be a rush to convert existing businesses (other than professional partnerships)
to the new available structures") (parenthetical in original); see also Thomas M. Wells & Anthony Pantano, Corporations
Should StandPat as Partnerships Shift to LLCs, NJ. L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at 10.
40. After only one year of nearly nationwide adoption of LLC statutes in state legislatures, Martindale-Hubbell Law
Directory listed 526 law firms registered as LLCs. Search of LEXIS, MARHUB library, USBIO file (Oct. 27, 1995)
(search is the following: "', LLC' or ', L.L.C.' or ', a Limited Liability Company") [hereinafter LEXIS LLC search].
41. SAMUELSON, supra note 22, § 8.4, at 8:17.
42. The Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory lists 526 law firms registered nationwide as LLCs, a quasi-nationwide
option for little more than a year. See LEXIS LLC search, supra note 40; supra text accompanying note 37. In contrast.
the Directory lists 11,520 firms registered nationwide as professional corporations, with professional corporations available
nationwide since the 1970's. Search of LEXIS, MARHUB library, USBIO file Oct. 27, 1995) (search is the following:
', PC' or ', P.C.' or ', a Professional Corporation"). If we assume nationwide adoption of the professional corporation
in 1970, the appearance of 11,520 professional legal corporations by 1995 implies an average annual formation/conversion
rate of about 460 firms per year. If we assume the LLC form has been available nationwide for one year, the appearance
of 526 LLC law firms by 1995 appears, at least initially, to follow a growth rate somewhat similar to that of the
professional corporation. The key word may be "initially": with the recent emergence of the LLP option, we may never
know the true extent of law firms' preference for the professional corporation over the limited liability company.
43. See Tx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, § 11.07, art. 6132b, § 15 (West Supp. 1995). Legislative history indicates
that the LLC statute and the LLP statute were enacted simultaneously. In addition, Texas amended its LLC statute in 1993
to include professionals. Weidlich, supra note 2, at 1, 38.
44. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-29-016 (Apr. 16, 1992) ("[The] LLP will be classified as a partnership for federal tax
purposes.'); Weidlich, supra note 2, at 38 ("mT1he extent of the Internal Revenue Service's commentary on the subject
has been one private-letter ruling finding that Texas' LLPs would be treated as partnerships.').
45. See statutes cited supra note 6.
46. The Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory for Texas lists 1082 professional corporations, 537 limited liability
partnerships, and only one limited liability company. Searches of LEXIS, MARHUB library, TXDIR file (Oct. 27, 1995)
(searches are the following: "', LLC' or ', L.L.C.' or ', a Limited Liability Company' and 'Professional Biographies
Section'; "', LLP' or ', L.L.P.' or ', a Limited Liability Partnership' and 'Professional Biographies Section'; "', PC' or
', P.C.' or ', a Professional Corporation' and ', Professional Biographies Section"').
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1. The LLP v. The General Partnership
The partnership has for decades been the most common form among law firms.47 Like
the LLP, the general partnership requires no formal written agreement: it is easy to create,
customize, and maintain.41 However, a general partnership imposes unlimited liability on
all partners, 49 in accordance with the aggregate theory of partnership, the partner's duty
of loyalty, and principles of agency." The minimal procedural burden of filing for LLP
status instead of remaining a general partnership seems easily compensated by the
benefits of limited liability.
47. See Eddy J. Rogers, Has Yourlinyt 7houghtAbout In corporating?, 50 TEX. BJ. 1194, 1194 (1987).
48. CARY & EIsENBERGsupra note 29, at 94 ("[A] general partnership can be organized and maintained with little
or no formalities or filing fees.").
49. This is true both under the Uniform and Revised Uniform Partnership Acts. The Revised Uniform Partnership
Act provides:
§ 306. Partner's Liability
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), all partners are liable jointly and severally for all obligations of
the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACr § 306 (1994).
Not all jurisdictions have adopted the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, but the original Uniform Partnership Act similarly
provides:
§ 15. Nature of Partner's Liability
All partners are liable
(a) Jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership under sections 13 [wrongful acts of
partners] and 14 [misappropriation by partners].
(b) Jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership; but any partner may enter into a separate
obligation to perform a partnership contract.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AT § 15 (1914) (alterations added).
Several commentators consider the Revised Uniform Partnership Act to have abandoned the aggregate theory of
partnership in favor of the entity theory. See John W. Larson et al., Partnership Law: Revised Uniform, Parinership Act
Reflects a Number of Sign ifiant Changes, 10 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX 232, 233 ("[The Revised Uniform Partnership Act]
contains a number of changes that unequivocally adopt the entity theory.'). But it should be noted that the Revised Act'
of 1994, though defining a partnership as an entity, retains the aggregate characteristic of unlimited liability for partners,
a critical characteristic in comparing traditional partnerships and LLPs. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 201 (1994)
(defining partnership as entity); see id. § 306(a) (addressing liability of partners); see also ROBERTW. HILLMAN, LAW
FIRMBREAKUPs 110 (1990) [hereinafter HILLMAN, BREAKUPS] (arguing that aggregate elements, such asjoint liability,
are likely to remain a part of Revised Uniform Partnership Act); ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HIIt.rfAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY
§§ 4:3 to 4:4,4:6 to 4:7 (1994) (noting that despite language implying adoption of entity view of partnership, Revised Act
retains the aggregate element of shared losses among partners).
50. Scholars have cited a number of possible reasons why partners have unlimited liability. First, the aggregate theory
of partnership views the partnership as a collective of individuals; each partner acts as an agent for her partners.
DICKERSON, supra note 28, at 8.
A second reason often given for unlimited liability for partners, especially in law firms, is that partners are assumed
to owe one another a high duty of loyalty. Therefore, both the benefits and the burdens of any individual partner are
assumed to be ratified by each of the other partners. Sie UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AC § 404(a)-(c) (1994); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT §§ 18,21 (1914); see aLso Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar Assoc. v. McClintock,
442 N.W.2d 607, 608 (Iowa 1989) (noting that "[m]ost law partnerships are founded upon a total trust and confidence
among the partners"); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) ("Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to
one anotherwhile the enterprise continues, the duty of the finest loyalty.").
A third justification for unlimited liability for members of a general partnership is that partners are best suited to be held
liable for the acts of the partnership; their investment of resources in the venture generally makes them the most motivated
and best situated to maximize partnership earnings and minimize partnership debts. See generally SHAVELL, supra note
20, at 170 ("If... the principal can observe and control the actor's level of care, then imposition of vicarious liability will
induce the principal to compel the actor to exercise optimal care.").
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2. The LLP v. The Limited Partnership
A limited partnership consists of one or more general partners and one or more limited
partners. The limited partner retains limited liability exposure, and is restricted to the
limited partner's investment in the business; the general partner retains unlimited liability
similar to a partner in a general partnership." Limited partnerships have the pass-through
tax treatment advantage.of the partnership.52 However, insulation of the limited partner
from liability for acts of the partnership beyond the limited partner's investment is
contingent upon the limited partner's refraining from active management of the
business. 3 While modem limited partnership acts have expanded the range of activities
in which a limited partner may engage without incurring unlimited liability,54 this range
is still insufficient to make the entity of much use to law firms, whose partners are usually
active and controlling participants in a law firm's operation.5 In contrast, the LLP offers
the same liability protection as a limited partnership, without the same restriction on the
partner's activity with respect to the partnership operation.
3. The LLP v. The Professional Corporation
Despite the advent of professional corporation statutes in the 1970's, offering firms
limited liability and a number of corporate tax advantages, 6 most law firms did not leave
the partnership realm for professional corporation form." First, partners feared that
adopting a corporate status would offend the public and injure their client goodwill by
implying a reduced concern for client interests." Second, malpractice claims were
51. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act reads in part:
[A] limited partner is not liable for the obligations of a limited partnership unless he [or she] is also a
general partner or, in addition to the exercise of his [or her] rights and powers as a limited partner, he [or
she] participates in the control of the business.
UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 303 (1985) (alterations in original). Conversely, § 403 reads:
(a) Except as provided in this [Act] or in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a limited
partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to the restrictions of a partner in a partnership
without limited partners.
(b) Except as provided in this [Act], a general partner of a limited partnership has the liabilities of a
partner in a partnership without limited partners to persons other than the partnership and the other
partners. Except as provided in this [Act] or in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a limited
partnership has the liabilities ofa partner in a partnership without limited partners to the partnership and
the other partners.
Id. § 403 (alterations in original).
52. Compare Keatinge, supra note 10, at 382 with CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 95.
53. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303 (a)-(b) (1985).
54. Id. § 305.
55. SAMUELSON, supra note 22, at 2:12 (describing the law partnership as "the ultimate cooperative organization,
a marriage of equals").
56. As explained in part I.B., the tax advantages of professional corporation statutes, indeed traditional C corporation
statutes as well, chiefly the favorable treatment afforded to qualified corporate retirement plans, were eliminated with
congressional tax reform legislation in the early 1980's. See text accompanying supra notes 24-26. Without the tax
advantages available in the 1970's, double taxation of corporate income arguably makes professional corporation statutes
even more onerous to law firms today than twenty years ago.
57. SAMUELSON, supra note 22, § 2.12, at 2:12 ("Despite the substantial advantages of incorporation, only 19 of
the 250 largest law firms have incorporated their practices."(footnote omitted)).
58. 1d § 2:1 1n.10 ("[Law firms'] work product was so important and the capitalization of their businesses was so
small that unlimited liability was necessary, it was thought, to provide adequate protection for clients.'); Martha
Middleton, Larger Law Firms Ponder Corporate Step, 67 A.B.A. J. 693 (1981); Steven Brill, Ways & Means: To P.C.
or Not to P.C., Am. LAW., Feb. 1981, at 10-11; Weidlich, supra note 2, at 1, 38 (quoting A.B.A. LLC Subcommittee
Chairman Robert R. Keatinge in saying that "[tlhere's a sort of knee-jerk reaction to anything that limits the liability of
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relatively infrequent and rarely of much financial substance, and thus did not warrant a
fundamental change in the firm's structure. 9 Third, professional corporation statutes
entailed a number of formational and operational burdens.6" Finally, many firms'
members simply preferred the traditional image of a law partnership and of being a
"partner":
Tradition dictates that when lawyers and accountants decide to mold a firm, they should
form a partnership. Despite the liability exposure, professionals have long cherished the
financial reward and status of "making partner." This tradition is a major reason why
partnerships prevail in the professional arena .... Nevertheless, partnerships (even with
their unlimited personal liability to partners) remain the most popular choice among
professionals fashioning a firm.6'
Another scholar commented that "customs and rituals have evolved over time that are
almost as important as the legal technicalities. Indeed, 'making partner' is the closest
experience to tenure outside ivory towers.
62
4. The LLP v. The LLC
As its closest cousin, the LLC offers law firms nearly every advantage that LLPs offer.
Most importantly, the LLC allows decentralized management (which the limited
partnership lacked), pass-through taxation (which the professional corporation lacked),
and limited liability (which the general partnership lacked). However, law firms appear
to prefer the LLP over the LLC.63 This preference likely is due to a lack of comfort with
the LLC linked to factors similar to those which prevented law firms from utilizing
professional corporation statutes: (1) aesthetic distaste for abandoning the partnership
form and (2) a desire to avoid procedural complexity.
a. Aesthetics
Many law firm partners are deciding against conversion to the LLC form because they
fear a public perception of impropriety and lack of professionalism, much like their
concerns about professional corporation statutes. Many firm partners fear that a client
greeted by an "attorney-shareholder" might perceive the attorney as more interested in
dividends than in the client's interests.' An LLP law firm, however, greets the public as
a partnership-in its formal decisionmaking, in its organizational structure, even in the
legal name it advertises to the public-albeit one with the initials "L.L." preceding the
"P." for "Partnership" on its letterhead.65 Also, though the availability of LLC statutes
a professional').
59. Ramos,supra note 21, at 1661.
60. Harlan, supra note 8, at A4 ("For years, most states have offered law firms ... the chance to become professional
corporations, gaining many liability protections. But such corporations carry tax burdens and reporting requirements that
can make them unattractive.").
61. Thomas W. Van Dyke & Paul G. Porter, LitnitedLiability Partnerships: The Next Generation, 63 J. KAN. B.
ASS'N., 16, 18.)
62. SAMUELSON. supra note 22, at 2:12.
63. See smpra note 47 and accompanying text.
64. See Weidlich, supra note 2, at 1, 38.
65. Id.; see Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 6132b, § 3.08(c) (West Supp. 1995).
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to lawyers varies, 66 LLP statutes generally have law firm use explicitly in mindY This
aids in the perception of firm partners that their adoption of the LLP form is socially
endorsed. Clients and the public aside, many attorneys also receive a subjective benefit
in self-esteem that they get from retaining the partnership designation for their law firm."
b. Procedural Complexity
In order to take advantage of the LLC's form, law firms must follow procedures similar
to those required under traditional corporate statutes.69 But unlike LLC statutes, the Texas
Act allows attainment of LLP status with miniscule procedural requirements. In addition
to offering the substantive benefits of limited liability and pass-through taxation, the
Texas Act eliminates practically all the burdensome structural and filing requirements
contained in former corporate statutes:70
Part of the problem with limited liability business structures is that the most widely
available forms-professional corporations and limited liability companies-are the
least attractive options for large law firms. It takes a considerable amount of work to
convert from a general partnership to these other structures, including rewriting the
firm's partnership agreement, forming a board of directors, and appointing officers...
Limited liability partnerships, on the other hand, don't have these disadvantages.
Where state law allows LLPs, any... general partnership can register as an LLP by
simply filling out a form with the secretary of state and paying a nominal annual fee per
partner. A firm does not have to create a board of directors, and may not even need to
rewrite its partnership agreement."'
While legal complexities ' may seem unlikely to scare a law firm, whose members deal
with legal rules daily, law firms may respond to the law differently as a "client" (namely,
a business choosing an operational form) than as counsel to other businesses seeking
entity forms.
66. Brewer, supra note 10, at 870 ("Professionals wishing to operate as LLCs initially face the traditional hurdle of
obtaining an explicit provision in state LLC laws allowing professionals to operate as LLCs."); see also McLaughlin, supra
note 10, at 244 ("[S]tates that have since enacted LLC acts have responded in a variety of fashions.).
67. See e.g., David B. Rae, LimitedLiability Partnerships: The 7me to Become One is Now, HOUS. LAW., Jan.-Feb.
1993, at 47 ("[I]t appears that the [Texas LLP] law was enacted with professional partnerships in mind ..... ); id at 47
n.3 ("Originally, [Texas] LLPs were limited only to professional partnerships.").
68. See also SAMUELSON, supra note 22, § 2.2A, at 2:12 (noting that in law flnns,"'making partner' is the closest
experience to tenure outside ivory towers'); Van Dyke & Porter, supra note 61, at 18.
69. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr §§ 1.20-.27, 1.40-A1, 2.01-.06, 16.20-.22 (1984); Draft Unif. Ltd.
Liability Co. Act § § 101-112, 201-206, 304(a) (1993), in 8 STATE LIMIE PARTNERSHT LAWS, supra note 6.
70. TEx. REV. STAT. ANN., art. 6132b, § 3.08(b), (c), (d) (West Supp. 1995); REVISED MODEL BUSiNESS CORP. ACT
§§ 1.20-.27, 2.01-.06, 16.20-.22 (1984).
71. Isom-Rodriguez, supra note 9, at 30; see also CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 94 ("Organizing a
corpoation... is a complex matter, normally requiring an attorney's services and filing fees.'); Blackman, supra note
39, at 5 ("[Mlost [firms] will probably opt for an LLP format because of the greater ease of formation ... .
72. See Van Dyke & Porter, supra note 61, at 17-18. Specifically, Van Dyke and Porter state:
[A]s a consequence of its swift introduction into the legal and business communities, the courts and IRS have
yet to answer some key questions about this hybrid business entity. These unanswered questions, in part, have
frustrated the use of the limited liability company as a business entity.
In many states.., the limited liability company statutes allow for flexibility in drafting so as to permit the LLP
to be classified for tax pusposes as either a corporation or a partnership. For this reason, drafting the limited liability
company organizational documents requires a knowledge of"association" taxation. A drafter must have a firm grasp
of the "corporate characteristics" which must be lacking in order for a limited liability company to be treated as a
partnership for federal tax purposes. Drafting organizational documents can thus be fraught with dangers to the
unwary.
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LLP statutes offer law firms all of the LLC's substantive benefits-active member
management, pass-through taxation, and limited liability-plus (1) the procedural benefits
of boilerplate filing and "business as usual" operation and (2) the image-preservation and
self-assurance of retaining a legal designation of "partnership." These advantages have
led far more law firm partnerships into the limited liability arena under LLP statutes than
with past alternatives, such as the limited partnership and the professional corporation.
Any change in behavior that would be caused by an individual law firm's conversion
from unlimited to limited liability will therefore occur in greater numbers of firms,
multiplying the aggregate effect on the practice of law and on legal clients.
5. The LLP v. The C Corporation
The traditional C corporation, like the LLP, possesses the characteristic of limited
liability.' Legislatures have always granted limited liability to corporate shareholders to
encourage their funding of enterprise. Skilled managers, lacking the monetary resources
to fund ventures, were thereby paired with investors who were unwilling to risk their
personal liability:
Legislatures grant limited liability to owners of corporations in order to facilitate
business formation in their states. As early as the 1800s, Jacksonian liberals made
persuasive arguments that a state's failure to grant limited liability to corporate owners
would drive capital to other states. Similar arguments are still made to legislatures today
to encourage legislatures to enact limited liability legislation....
... Following the Industrial Revolution, capital-intensive businesses required
increasing amounts of capital. In addition, the Industrial Revolution created a demand
for workers with more specialized skills. Often workers with the necessary specialized
skills could not accumulate the capital necessary to operate a post-Industrial Revolution
business. As a result, those contributing the capital necessary to operate the business
were not necessarily those with the specialized skills necessary to operate the business.
Granting limited liability to those who contributed capital encouraged investment;
-because investors could invest without risking their full net worth. While investors are
often willing to risk their entire net worth to businesses they operate, investors, absent
limited liability, are not willing to invest in businesses that they do not operate or
closely monitor. With limited liability, owners are free to invest in diverse enterprises
without the need of incurring the excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise
closely.74
This policy of protecting "unskilled, absent investors" seems inapplicable to close
corporations, since their owners have control over the actions of the corporation as
compensation for the risks of unlimited liability. 75 Nonetheless, as a general rule, close
73. REviSED MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr § 2.02 cmt. 3e (1984) ("The basic tenet of modem corporation law is
that shareholders are not liable for the corporation's debts by reason of their status as shareholders.").
74. Bahls, . ipra note 30, at 55-56 (footnotes omitted); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward
Unlimited ShareholderLiabiliiyfor Corporate Torts, 100 YALEL.J. 1879, 1924-26 (1991) (suggesting that limited liability
in tort has been the prevailing rule for corporations in the United States, as elsewhere, for more than a century, creating
incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting corporations to avoid the full costs of their activities). See generally Paul
Halpem et al., An Fcononic Analysis of Limited Liability i Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 118 (1980)
(setting out arguments on each side of the issue of limited liability for corporations).
75. See Robert NV. Hillman, Limited Liability and Externalization of Risk- A Comment on the Death of Partnership,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 477, 484 (1992) (criticizing Professor Ribstein's article, Ribstein, supra note 10, for using the same
limited liability justification for public corporations as for close corporations); see also I F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT
B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.10, at 47 (1994) ("[Llimited liability serves an additional role for
public corporations not usually applicable for close corporation: it encourages the development of a public market for
stocks, facilitating the free transferability of shares.").
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corporations, and thus owners of close corporations, like their traditional C corporation
counterparts, enjoy limited liability as well.76 However, all C corporations are taxed both
at the entity level and at the shareholder level, unlike the LLP." In addition, corporations
require a formal agreement and compliance with a host of specific statutory requirements,
such as formal incorporation, periodic filings, and payment of various fees. 78 Many
formalities are advisedly observed even after incorporation, in order for shareholders in
a corporation to avoid personal liability via piercing of the corporate veil. 9 Comparison
between the C corporation and the LLP may seem a less worthy endeavor for the purposes
of law firms, as no state allows attorneys to utilize traditional corporate statutes.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that law firms could incorporate through traditional
means, such a move would involve formation and operational burdens similar to LLCs
and professional corporations, and tax burdens similar to professional corporations.
In sum, the LLP offers law firms at least one advantage over every alternative business
entity form available to law firms. LLPs possess limited liability (lacked by the
partnership), active member management (lacked by the limited partnership), pass-
through taxation (lacked by the professional corporation), and aesthetic simplicity
(lacked by the LLC). As Parts II, III, and IV argue, however, the notion of LLPs as the
"best of all possible worlds""° for law firm partners comes at a considerable cost to the
public.
II. How LLP LAW FIRMS WILL FOSTER LEGAL
MALPRACTICE
This Part will argue that allowing the use of the LLP form will breed malpractice.
Limited liability will encourage lawyers to avoid co-monitoring. Thus, as more lawyers
fail to prevent their colleagues' mistakes, the occurrence of malpractice will increase.
A. The Deterrence Principle
The deterrence principle of tort law owes much of its support to the economic analysis
of tort law, which gained prominence in 1961 with the publication of Guido Calabresi's
first article on tort law and Ronald Coase's revolutionary article on social cost." William
Landes and Richard Posner recently summarized the deterrence priniciple:
The germ of the analysis is [Jeremy] Bentham's proposition that people maximize utility
in all areas of life. Although this implies that liability rules can be used to affect the
level of accidents, Bentham himself did not comment on this implication. A more direct
antecedent of the modern economic approach to torts is the concept of social cost, or
external cost, notably as articulated by [A.C.] Pigou. Using among other examples that
of the locomotive that emits sparks which damage the crops of farmers located along the
railroad right-of-way, Pigou noted the potential divergence of social cost from private
76. See also REVISED MODEL BUSINESs CORP. ACT § 2.02 cmt. 3e (1984).
77. DICKERSON, supra note 28, at 9. This principle is commonly known as "double taxation."
78. REVISED MODELBUSINEss CORP. ACT §§ 1.20-.27,2.01-.06, 16.20-.22 (1984); see also CARY& EISENBERG,
supra note 29, at 94.
79. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 29, at 94. Note that the requirement that corporations follow formalities in order
to retain limited liability has more truth in law than in fact. Many corporations, especially close corporations, commonly
fail to strictly follow corporate requirements. Bahls, supra note 30, at 50.
80. VOLTAIRE, CANDmEpassiz (Lowell Bair trans. & ed., Bantam Classic ed., 1959) (1759).
81. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALELJ. 499 (1961); Ronald
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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cost. The crop damage, he argued, is not a private cost to the railroad; and only private
costs determine behavior. But it is a social cost because the farmer is a member of
society, as is the railroad. Therefore, unless some means were found to force the railroad
to internalize the cost, there would be too much or too careless railroading. 2
Drawing on ideas first introduced by Calabresi and Coase and later embraced in Posner's
writings, the deterrence principle seeks to assign liability in a manner that encourages
people to act efficiently and thereby avoid injury to others." By deterring conduct which
causes accidents, accidental harms to society are reduced. Today deterrence is a primary
justification for tort liability rules,84 including those in the area of professional
malpraptice.8 5
B. Effect of a General Partnership-to-LLP Conversion on
Co-monitoring
Limited liability law partnerships will discourage co-monitoring among firms' lawyers
because limited liability gives less incentive than unlimited liability for lawyers to co-
monitor. In a general partnership, a lawyer will be held liable for any acts of malpractice
by her firm, including acts of her colleagues, whether or not the lawyer was involved in
the particular act of malpractice.8 6 This increases the incentive of every lawyer to take
actions8 7 to reduce the possibility of mistakes by colleagues.s
However, an LLP law firm partner cannot be held liable for any acts of her co-partners
unless that partner participated in or supervised the malpractice.89 A lawyer's insulation
from liability for acts of other lawyers in a limited liability law partnership could
arguably reduce the motivation of lawyers to actively monitor fellow attorneys. In
addition, since lawyers are held liable only for acts which they are in some sense
82. WILLiAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUcTURE OF TORT LAW 7, 31-53 (1987)
(citations omitted).
83. See generally GutDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OFACCIDENTS (1970); Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence,
I J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) [hereinafter Posner, A Theory ofNegligence]; Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to
Protect a Property Interest, 14 J.L. & ECON. 201 (1971) [hereinafter Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property
Interest].
84. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1994)
(listing "creating safety incentives" as the first rationale for product liability doctrines).
85. LANDES &POsNEJsupra note 82, at 11 ("[Tnhere is widespread agreement that the imposition of tort liability
on professionals (for example, in the form of medical malpractice), and on business and other enterprises, does affect
behavior, does deter-some think too much!").
86. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(a) (1994); UNIF. PARTNERSIP ACT § 15 (1914).
87. See discussion infra part ml.C. (discussing various actions taken by law firms to prevent malpractice).
88. Developments in the Law-Lawyers'Responsibilities andLawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1547,1672
(1994) [hereinafterDevelopinents]:
Underan unlimited liability regime, attorneys are personally liable for the professional misdeeds of their
law partners when neither the wrongdoer nor the law firm can pay a malpractice judgment. This
arrangement ... deters wrongdoing by imposing strong third-party monitoring incentives. Vicariously
liable partners have both their personal assets and the reputation of the firm at stake. Thus, partners are
more likely to monitor each other's work.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1246 (1984).
Professor Sykes states:
Under vicarious liability ... an enterprise cannot evade judgments as long as the principal and the
agent together have sufficient assets to cover them.... [W]hen vicarious liability forces the enterprise
to "internalize" the full cost of its actions, the result is a socially efficient level of loss-avoidance
investment by the agent and a privately (and socially) efficient level of risk sharing between the principal
and the agent.
89. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 6132b, § 3.08 (West Supp. 1995).
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"connected with,"9 the insulation from vicarious liability that LLP statutes create will
encourage lawyers to take steps to separate themselves from potential connection to
malpractice. Such steps might include informal fragmentation among law firm
attorneys, 91 as each lawyer begins to understand that while she will share in the profits
of every partner's success, she will not share in paying the price of the mistakes of those
partners with whom she does not work.92 In short, the fewer partners a lawyer works with,
the lower the potential liability to which she will be exposed.
Other implications of the LLP form include the increased departmentalization of law
firms, since LLP firms would have an interest in encouraging formal fragmentation
among its lawyers by instituting liability damage control.93  Such formal
departmentalization would heighten even further the informal fragmentation caused by
lawyers' awareness of limited liability. Such a rift would be especially likely to occur
between partners in high-risk practice areas, such as corporate securities, and low-risk
practice areas, such as insurance defense. This is because partners with the highest risk
would perform the type of work most likely to be perceived by their lower risk
counterparts as dangerous to "touch." Lower risk practitioners would feel most inclined
to avoid contact with high-risk partners, in order to minimize their exposure to increased
personal liability.94
C. Effect of Decreased Co-monitoring on Malpractice
The decreased monitoring which limited liability encourages among a law firm's
partners will result in an increase in malpractice. As fewer lawyers within a firm consult
with and "check up" on one another, the quality of legal service that each lawyer provides
becomes more and more dependent on the individual aptitude of each lawyer." The
increased solitude among a law firm's partners heightens the likelihood of a legal
oversight formerly avoidable through co-monitoring and peer consultation. This common
sense notion-that no individual is infallible-finds support in the disproportionate
number of malpractice judgments against solo practitioners versus multilawyer firms.96
90. Obviously, under an unlimited liability regime, all the "connection" one needs is membership in the partnership.
Under limited liability, this is a more vague question. See id.
91. Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the Office of Thrift Supervision. and the
Pursuit ofthe Dollar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 985,1016 ("(T]he separate groups in the various firms might not cooperate with
each other as efficiently as they do now (even though they might inhabit the same building as they currently do).");
Weidlich, supra note 2, at 38 ("[T]here are cultural questions as well. Some people fear that partners won't have as much
impetus to draw their wagons around a colleague who's been accused of wrongdoing once their own assets are safe.).
92. See also Curtis, supra note 91, at 1016; Weidlich, supra note 2, at 1. Compare REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 306(a) (1994) (holding all partners jointly and severally liable for all obligations of the partnership) with UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15 (1914) (allowing partners in an unlimited liability partnership to enter into a separate obligation
to perform a partnership contract).
93. See Adams, supra note 3, at 2.
94. Id. Specifically, Adams states:
[Each] partner would no longer be equally likely to pay should a huge malpractice liability come due. The
LLP form could drive a wedge between partners who handle large corporate transactions, where risks of
large malpractice costs are greatest, and partners in a less isk-prone department such as trusts and estates
Id.
95. See SISAVELL, supra note 20, at 170-75 (discussing how vicarious liability of principal affects agent's level of
care).
96. See A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE ON LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGAL
MALPRACTICE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL MALPRACTICE DATA CENTER 31 (1989) (reporting results of study
showing that 35% of all malpractice claims were solo practitioners, while 44% were two- to five-lawyer firms); Ramos,
supra note 21, at 1735 (reporting results of study showing that 38% of all malpractice claims were solo practitioners, while
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In short, from the client's point of view, two lawyers' heads are almost always better than
one, because it increases the likelihood that either lawyer will catch the other's error, or,
through peer consultation, one lawyer will discover the error in time to correct it.
D. Response to the Malpractice Deterrence Problem
LLP proponents have a number of potential responses to the malpractice deterrence
problem, each of which suffer from one or more defects.
1. Minimizing Insurance Costs
LLP advocates might first respond to the deterrence problem by arguing that there will
be little decrease in monitoring caused by conversion to the LLP form due to the firm's
countervailing incentive to avoid rising malpractice insurance costs. 97 LLP advocates
might argue ihat lawyers in LLP firms will maintain their present level of co-monitoring
in order to maintain the same level of risk, and thereby keep their insurance premiums
from increasing."
There are two responses to this argument. First, it incorrectly assumes that insurance
companies either do accurately price or are able to accurately price their premiums based
on an individual firm's internal monitoring techniques. It is true that some forms of first-
party insurance coverage, such as automobile accident policies, do "merit-rate" insureds
by giving credit for factors such as sex, age, and accident record." But in most third-party
insurance coverage settings, including professional liability insurance, insurers perform
a mere cursory analysis of an insured's risk prior to assigning a policy"0 0 and fail to
substantially monitor changes in the insured's risk during the period of coverage.'0t In
the area of legal malpractice insurance, this "hands-off' approach by insurers may be due
in part to the wide range of subjective differences in law firm monitoring, thereby
50% were two- to five-lawyer firms).
97. Ribstein, supra note 10, at 434-35; see Developments, supra note 88, at 1668-74 (discussing strategies firms may
use to lower their malpractice costs).
'2 98. Ribstein, supra note 10, at 435.
99. Curiously, the behavioral impact of these "merit-rating" schemes on behavior has been criticized. See Daniel W.
Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 155 (1993). Professor Shuman states:
Even in insurance markets where liability insurance premiums are commonly thought to reflect claims
experience, the linkage between safe behavior and insurance premiums is questionable. Although it is
commonly assumed that premiums for automobile insurance reflect individual experience including
accidents and traffic violations, the rating is largely determined by considerations such as age, gender,
and geographic area. If you are young, male, and live in New York, for example, your automobile
insurance will be high even if you never experience an accident or receive a traffic ticket. You can
remove yourself from this group only by aging, having a sex change, or moving, not by driving more
carefully. The influence of a surcharge on drivers who have recently been involved in accidents has not
been linked to safer driving.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Stephen D. Sugarman, DoingAway with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555,575-77 (1985).
100. Gar T. Schwartz, The Ethics andthe Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 318-19
(1990) ("[Many lines of 'personal' insurance-including homeowners liability insurance and professional malpractice
insurance-make no effort to reflect the individual's accident potential.) (emphasis added).
101. HILTONL. STEIN, HOWTo SUEYOUR LAWYEM: THE CONStIMER GUIDE TO LEGAL MALPRACnCE 156 (1989).
Stein states:
Another example of risk management involves an insurance application form that is completed by
attorneys. All attorneys must check off whether they have a docket control and diary system. The
insurance companies, however, do not check on these systems. If the insurance companies did, the
lawyers would be forced to engage in risk management by implementing controls. At the present time,
lawyers have no incentive to implement controls.
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resulting in an insufficiently definable range of risks among firms within the context of
monitoring. 0 2 Legal malpractice insurance companies instead are likely to calculate
premiums on more readily measurable factors, including firm size, geographic location,
and area of practice. 0 Many legal malpractice insurers do not even make a firm's
malpractice claim history a factor in pricing its premiums." 4 Firms and their lawyers thus
feel little pressure from an insurer to monitor internally, since the quality of their
monitoring does not affect premium prices.0 5
Second, even assuming an effect of co-monitoring on risk that would cause insurers to
supply insurance at a higher premium rate to an LLP firm, the release from vicarious
liability will reduce members' need to demand maximum insurance coverage for their
firm. Unlimited liability, because it exposes the personal assets of every law partner to
a malpractice judgment, creates a greater incentive to fully insure than limited liability.'
102. Similar explanations have been offered in the medical malpractice area. See Shuman, supra note 99, at 154-55
("There is considerable doubt about whether a meaningful and actuarially credible experience rating program can be
devised for liability insurance against claims that are as occasional an event to the individual doctor as are malpractice
suits.") (quoting THE REPORT OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK: PATIENTS,
DOCTORS & LAWYERs: MEDICAL INJuRY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK at
2-8 (1990)); see also George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis andModern Tort Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1542
(1987) ("The principal reason risks are uninsurable is that insurers are unable to narrow the assortment of risks within a
pool.').
The "hands-off" attitude of legal malpractice insurers is reflected in the inaugural issue of a journal published by
Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society ("ALAS"), a legal malpractice mutual insurance company:
ALAS' fundamental philosophy is that its loss prevention program is advisory only, and that inflexible
edicts are to be avoided.... Each Member Finn is not only permitted, but affirmatively encouraged, to
apply ALAS' recommendations with such refinements as it deems fit to its own special circumstances
and unique firm culture.
Robert E. O'Malley et al., Preventing Legal Malpractice in Large Law Firms, I ALAS LOSS PREVENTION J. 2,2 (1990).
103. See Shuman, supra note 99, at 154-55. Professor Shuman states:
There is no evidence that the cost of liability insurance has reduced the rate of accidental injury....
Physicians' malpractice insurance premiums, for example, rarely reflect claims experience for an
individual practitioner, but instead reflect area of practice specialty and geographic location ....
Even in insurance markets where liability insurance premiums are commonly thought to reflect claims
experience, the linkage between safe behavior and insurance premiums is questionable.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Richard J. Bonnie, The Efficacy of Law as a Paternalistic Instrument, in NEBRASKA
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1985: IHELAWAS ABEHAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 131,191 (1985) ("T]here is no evidence
that awareness of the 'cost' of having an accident (in terms of increased premiums) actually motivates people to drive more
safely.').
104. STEIN, supra note 101, at 155-56 (lamenting the lack of"experience rating" of insureds by legal malpractice
industry).
105. Arguably, a firm's malpractice claim record (which may influence an insurer's calculation of insurance premiums,
but see id at 156) is influenced by the quality of internal monitoring among the firm's lawyers. But this only means that
monitoring techniques affect insurance costs, not vice versa. The use of a firm's malpractice claim recordprior to its
adoption of the LLPfor, will be of limited help in an insurer's calculation of premiums that accurately reflect the firm's
internal monitoring techniques after LLP conversion. A law firm most likely will experience a rise in insurance premiums
only after its conversion to LLP status causes it to decrease monitoring and commit more malpractice. This will cause its
malpractice record to show an increased frequency and severity of malpractice claims, and only then will the insurer
increase the firm's insurance premium. Only at that time might the firm respond with increased monitoring to improve
its malpractice record in an attempt to reduce insurance costs. Though logical in theory, this linkage is unsupported by
empirical evidence. Shuman, supra note 99, at 154. Shuman states, "There is no evidence that the cost of liability
insurance has reduced the rate of accidental injury.... Physicians' malpractice insurance premiums, for example, rarely
reflect claims experience for an individual practitioner, but instead reflect area of practice specialty and geographic
location." Id. Even if the link did exist, it would not avoid the cost borne by malpractice victims in the interim between
the firm's adoption of the LLP form and the insurer's eventual increase in the firm's premium. Sugarman, supra note 99,
at 576 (discussing the "lapse" factor involved in experience rating by insurers).
106. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 74, at 1888-89. Professors Hansmann & Kraakman state specifically:
[With unlimited liability, a shareholder having personal assets sufficient to cover any tort judgment will
have an incentive to purchase full insurance. In turn, such insurance will give the shareholder efficient
incentives to internalize costs with respect to both level of care and magnitude of investment.
With limited liability, on the other hand, the shareholder will often have an incentive either to
purchase no insurance or to purchase insurance tfiat is insufficient to cover the full range of losses that
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In a general partnership, a firm's lawyers will each be affected by firm liability and
personal liability. But in an LLP firm, unlike a partnership, a lawyer is not subject to
vicarious liability. In other words, the lawyer is not subject to personal liability for
professional acts of other partners in the lawyer's firm. This reduced liability affects a
firm's desired coverage, which helps determine its insurance premiums, just as does its
malpractice risk.to7 Since lawyers not subject to vicarious liability no longer fear losing
their personal assets in a malpractice claim against a fellow lawyer, they will demand less
insurance for the firm, and thus the firm will pay less in premiums. Because a firm paying
for expensive insurance has more incentive to find ways (such as co-monitoring) to
reduce insurance costs than a firm with cheap insurance, LLP firms will have less
incentive than traditional partnerships to co-monitor in order to keep premiums down.
Even if a law firm's status as an LLP causes it to pay a higher premium to obtain a
particular level of coverage, that particular level of coverage will be lower than the firm
would demand as a traditional partnership.' 0'
2. Protecting One's Interest in the Firm
LLP advocates might also argue that an LLP law firm's partners will maintain their
former monitoring levels to protect their financial and reputational interests in the firm.
This argument raises the question of whether the partners' original investment interest
will sufficiently counter their decreased interest in preventing personal liability.
However, the desire of law partners for limited liability indicates a philosophical shift
away from valuing firm interests and toward valuing personal interests. This argument
is consistent with the increased mobility of law firm partners and the rise in law firm
her corporation might cause. Liability insurance sold to businesses invariably has an upper limit on
coverage, and it appears that most firms choose a relatively low coverage limit, suggesting that
incomplete insurance is a common strategy.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
107. Priest, supra note 102, at 1545 ("An additional way that risk pools are segregated... is by the level ofinsurance
protection desired.").
108. Advocates for limited liability law firms have argued that mandatory insurance requirements will prevent LLP
firms from underinsuring. See In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 263 A.2d 692, 697 (RLI. 1970) (approving of limited liability
for professional corporations). The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that "[b]ecause of the requirement of mandatory
liability insurance, the clients served by the corporation and the members of the public who otherwise deal with the
corporation will not suffer by reason of such limited liability." Id. However, Professors Hansmann & Kraakman have
argued that mandatory insurance cannot sufficiently substitute for unlimited liability. See Hausmann & Kraakman, supra
note 74, at 1927-28. Professors Hansmann & Kraakman argue:
Coverage-oriented alternatives to unlimited liability include such simple devices as establishing fixed
insurance coverage or capitalization levels for firms, which would then be enforced by holding corporate
officers or directors personally liable for a breach of the statutory norm. Putting aside for the moment the
potential enforcement problems, the obvious difficulty with coverage rules is their inflexibility. No single
coverage level would be satisfactory across industries, firms of different sizes, or even production
technologies. Moreover, regulators would have great difficulty in acquiring the information necessary
to make fine-grained determinations of appropriate coverage levels, particularly since the magnitude of
potential tort losses would often change rapidly over time with new technological developments. At best,
then, fixed coverage levels would become minimum coverage levels that would be keyed to the smallest
and safest finns in the relevant industry grouping. At worst, such levels would become wholly irrelevant
to the actual magnitude of tort losses, as clearly happened in the infamous taxi cab cases. In either case,
fixed coverage levels would be unlikely to change the basic incentive problems associated with limited
liability.
Id at 1927 (footnotes omitted).
Note also that incorporated firms who fail to insure against the cost of mistakes may be subject to the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil. See Minton v. Cavaney, 364 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1961). The doctrine uses undereapitalization as
one factor in holding shareholders personally liable for the debts of the corporation. William P. Hackney & Tracey G.
Benson, Shareholder Liabilityfor Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Prrr. L. REv. 837, 851 (1982).
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breakups in recent years."° This implies that firm investment interests will not completely
preserve present monitoring levels.
3. Danger of Overmonitoring
LLP advocates might respond to the malpractice deterrence problem by arguing that
unlimited liability actually breeds malpractice by encouraging too many lawyers in a firm
to insist on working on every project."' Overmonitoring may breed more mistakes by
encouraging lawyers to feel less intimately connected with, and thus less individually
responsible for, the quality of their clients' services."' In other words, "too many cooks
spoil the broth."
But a law office is not a kitchen; implying as much unrealistically simplifies the nature
of law practice. Even in small practices, the entire firm is rarely consulted on any
particular client or case." 2 In traditional law partnerships, from the boutique to the
metropolitan firm, lawyers undertake the bulk of their work individually or in teams.
These teams are often arranged by practice specialty and consult periodically with other
attorneys within the firm."' Though every lawyer may not be consulted on every client's
case, a considerable amount of consultation occurs with most client cases. In most firms,
a substantial number of "lawyer's heads" are utilized in the majority of major legal
actions taken. Using the kitchen analogy, the practice team may very well play the chef,
but junior attorneys likely serve as assistants, peer partners as advisors, and senior
partners as the enterprise's owners who either give the "dishes" a personal "taste test"
during updates at periodic firm meetings or hear the news, good or bad, from the "critics"
(i.e., the clients).
Co-monitoring does not endanger client services. Rather, a custom of teamwork is
considered vital to effective work in a law firm. Unlimited liability is arguably
responsible for this custom because it encourages lawyers to monitor and interact.
Unlimited liability encourages lawyers to supervise more often, scrutinize their
colleagues' work more carefully, and employ internal checks to avoid malpractice."
4
Limited liability, on the other hand, reduces monitoring because the rational lawyer shuns
teamplay in favor of reclusion.
109. See HRLMAN, BREAKUPS, supra note 49, at 110 (discussing continuing liability of withdrawing partners); Steven
Brill, The End ofPartnership?, AM. LAW., Dec. 1989, at 3.
110. This breed of complaint is common among members of large law partnerships, who cite the difficulties of
consulting every partner on every issue and obtaining consensus. SAMUJEISON, supra note 22, at 2:41.
111. Ribstein, supra note 10, at 435 ("Although lawyers may have some additional incentive under unlimited liability
to monitor co-partners, this increased monitoring may not be particularly useful, indeed may be counterproductive, to the
extent that it involves second-guessing complex professional decisions.").
112. See SAMUELSON, supra note 22, at 2:12-2:13 ("The legal work itself is done by small teams of partners and
associates. Most teams consist of between two and six lawyers, although in a major litigation case the group may be as
large as 30.").
113. See id. (noting modem trend toward attorney specialization).
114. Developments, supra note 88, at 1672 (1994); see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 110; Hansmanr &
Kraakman, supra note 74, at 1882-83; Sykes, supra note 88, at 1246.
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4. Impracticality of Co-Monitoring
LLP advocates might respond to the malpractice deterrence problem with an
impracticality argument: the age-old, co-monitoring atmosphere of the traditional law
partnership is a thing of the past, replaced by the modem law firm, employing hundreds
of associates and partners.' Such a mammoth business enterprise, so goes the argument,
cannot be expected to monitor or deter the malpractice of every attorney."
6
There are three problems with the impracticality argument. First, it assumes that all law
firms are large. In fact, less than ten percent of all lawyers work in firms of twenty or
more attorneys." 7 Such small firms do not boast offices on opposite coasts, partners
numbering in the several hundreds, or other burdens which arguably might make co-
monitoring more burdensome. For LLP proponents to advocate abandoning rules of
liability which are outdated for the few, rather than the many, is questionable.
Second, strong evidence indicates that large firms are in fact more able than small firms
to co-monitor. A large firm's revenue base allows it to shoulder the considerable
overhead cost required to launch and maintain many co-monitoring tools unavailable to
smaller firms. These tools include: (a) supervisory personnel structuring, with senior
partners who watch partners who watch associates, (b) elaborate training programs for
associates and partners, and (c) computer-automated case management, calendering, file
storage, and telecommunication."s
A third problem with the impracticality argument exists. The position that some large
firms cannot monitor their attorneys may imply a larger problem. Perhaps it is the large
lawfirm, not co-monitoring, that is "impractical." If large firms are unable to monitor the
acts of their attorneys sufficiently to make partners comfortable with the thought of being
held liable for the acts of other partners, then perhaps large law firms themselves run
counter to public policy."9 Perhaps the wealth gained from large law firms' economies
115. See Brll, supra note 109, at 3 ("Law finms are so big now that partners not only aren't friends with one another,
they often don't know one another... In short, except for a diminishing minority of quaint holdouts, the days of all-for-
one, one-for-all partnership among equally entitled colleagues are over."). Note that Brill tames his obituarial
characterization a bit later in his article:
For while law partnerships may neier be the band of loyal friends and colleagues that many once were,
the business of law demands that they be collectives of professionals who trust one another, who pretty
much like one another, and who believe in the collective values and legitimacy of the institution.
Id at 35 (emphasis in original).
116. Id (contrasting the modem institutionalized firm's need to plan for quality control with older firm's ability to
do so quickly); see also Orey, supra note 1, at 81 ("[T'he actions of a partner you don't even know, working in an office
on the other side of the country, could cost you your house and force your kids to go to public school.").
117. BAMWRA A.CURRAN ET AL, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSIONINTHE 1980'S 3 (Table 1.4.3) (1985).
118. William T. Braithwaite, How ls Technology Affecting the Practice and Profession of Law?, 22 TEX. TECH. L.
REV. 1113, 1129-33, 1144-46, 1147-51 (1991) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of certain law firm
technologies); Jon E. Klemens, Note, The Future of Technology in Law Firms, A.B.A. J., July 1989, at 82,86 (discussing
advantages of computer software for electronic mail and messaging, document review, internal and external
communications, and access by home computers).
119. See David W. Leebron, LimitedLiability, Tort Victims and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565,1577-78 (stating
that when the insurance market fails to adequately protect corporate resources from liability, "unlimited liability would
serve a valuable regulatory function"); Developmeni, supra note 88, at 1668 (acknowledging a "social benefit [in] forcing
incompetent lawyers into bankruptcy"); see also Hansman & Kraakman, supra note 74, at 1888 (discussing the inviability
of small corporations with unlimited liability). Professors Hansmann and Kraakman state specifically:
Undoubtedly, some small corporations that are viable under limited liability would cease to be so under
unlimited liability, since they could not buy adequate insurance and their shareholders would be unwilling
to expose personal assets to the risks of a tort judgment. But there is no reason to assume that such small
firms should exist--that is, that they have positive net social value. In fact, an important advantage of
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of scale, economies of scope, 2 ' and attorney specialization' is insufficient to protect
clients whose lawyers' malpractice injures them beyond the limits of firm assets and
insurance. Such underinsurance scenarios are not rare,' and may occur more frequently
as law firms grow larger and, as LLP advocates assert, become less able to self-monitor.
Perhaps it is not time to "kill all the lawyers, " " but instead, to kill all the large law
firms.
5. Professional Limits
Finally, LLP advocates might respond to the malpractice deterrence problem by
arguing that professional rules, such as the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, will prevent lawyers from allowing their
colleagues to commit more malpractice. 24 A lawyer has a duty to avoid any interest
adverse to the representation of his client, such as choosing to ignore the negligent
behavior of a fellow partner. 25 Doing otherwise would create a conflict between the
lawyer's interest in minimizing personal liability and the lawyer's duty to represent the
interests of clients.
The problem with this argument is that professional rules are neither intended nor
capable of preventing malpractice by lawyers, and thus are ineffective substitutes for
unlimited liability in deterring malpractice. Disciplinary rules and enforcement
procedures governing the legal profession are explicitly not intended to prevent
malpractice by law firms. The American Bar Association advocates the Model Rules and
Model Code not as bases for malpractice claims, but as guidelines for ethical behavior
unlimited liability is precisely that it would force such firms-which are effectively being subsidized by
their tort victims-out of business.
Id (emphasis in original).
120. This is a concept which advances that it is cheaper to produce many related projects (at a large firm) than to
produce each project individually.
121. SAMUELSON, supra note 22, at 2:17.
122. To begin with, malpractice claims themselves are neither infrequent nor frivolous. An A.B.A. study in
conjunction with every major legal malpractice insurer showed that over a five-year period , a third of all malpractice
claims resulted in a settlement or judgment for the plaintiff. STANDING COMMItE ON LAWYERS' PROFESSIONAL
L Brn-nY, AMERICAN BAR AssOcIATIoN, CHARACTERIsnCs OF LEGAL MALPRACnCE: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
LEGAL MALPRACTICE DATA CENTER 3, 41, 141 (1989). Further, incidents of high legal malpractice judgments are not
uncommon and may be increasing in frequency. For example, one of the largest recoveries against a Texas law firm was
against Jenkins & Gilchrist in Dallas, in which a handful of partners advised a thrift that later failed. The firm settled with
regulators in 1989 for $20 million. Harlan, supra note 8, at A6. In another example, the firm Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays
& Handier exceeded its policy limits when it was forced to pay $20 million to bondholders in 1990 and $41 million to the
federal government in 1992 to settle claims arising from its representation of Lincoln Savings & Loan. Adams, supra note
3, at 1.
Though the case ofKayo Scholer is the only known example of a large firm facing a malpractice judgment which
exceeds its insurance, it is entirely conceivable that a large firm could face a malpractice judgment of $150 million or $200
million in the near future, id, and that such ajudgment would exceed the firm's malpractice insurance. See Milo Geyelin,
Lawyers and Clients, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 1994, at B3 (noting possibility of partners losing personal assets as a result
of a malpractice judgment against another partner); Weidlich, supra note 2, at 38 ("[lit is not unusual for personal assets
to be put in harm's way.") (quoting Martin I. Lubaroffof the Wilmington, Delaware firm of Richards, Layton & Finger,
P.A.). In addition, it is impossible to know how many law firms have settled claims in amounts which exceeded their
policy limits or would have if tried in court.
123. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, se. 2.
124. Comelia H. Tuite, Partner Liability, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 90.
125. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1994); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-1 (1980); id. EC 5-2.
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which, if violated, serve as grounds for reprimand or disbarment. 26 Courts give limited
weight to violations of rules of the profession as support for findings of malpractice
liability. 27 Second, even when the rules are used in accordance with the ABA's intent in
intra-profession disciplinary actions against attorneys, they are not uniformly enforced
nor effective in encouraging lawyers to adhere to professional standards. 28 Professional
rules will do little to keep the malpractice of lawyers in check upon a law firm's
conversion from a general partnership to an LLP form.
This Part has argued that limited liability law partnerships will breed malpractice by
discouraging co-monitoring among lawyers. Part III will argue that LLPs shift legal
malpractice costs onto clients, who are unable to effectively prevent malpractice.
III. How LLP LAW FIRMS WILL SHIFT MALPRACTICE RISK
TO INEFFICIENT LOSS PREVENTORS
LLP law firms will not only foster malpractice by discouraging lawyers from co-
monitoring, they will also shift the costs of preventing underinsured malpractice onto
clients, who are less capable loss preventors.
A. The Loss-Prevention Principle
The principle of efficient loss prevention, like deterrence, dates back to 1961 with the
publication of articles by Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi. 29 While deterrence guides
tort law in discouraging accidents by assigning liability to someone, the loss prevention
principle takes things a step further: it guides tort law by deciding to whom liability most
properly applies. In his article The Problem of Social Cost, Coase argued that in
assigning legal liability to one of two individuals, the choice is socially irrelevant as long
as each individual bears equal transaction costs in avoiding a loss.3 However, if one
126. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Scope para. 18 (1994) ("Violation of a Rule should not give rise
to a cause of action nor should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached.... [These Rules] are not
designed to be a basis for civil liability.'); id. Rule 5.1 cmt. ("Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for
another lawyer's conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules."); see also HIuLMAN, BREAKUPs,'supra
note 49, at 100 ('Vicarious liability for the malpractice of other partners... is a product ofpartnership law rather than
of the norms of legal ethics."); L. RAY PATTERSON & THOMAS B. METZLOFF, LEGAL ETHICs: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBII.TY § 12.01 (3d. ed. 1989) ("The point is made by the bar's persistent position that the breach of a rule of
ethics shall not be a basis of liability.).
127. Courts have refused to allow professional rule violations alone to support malpractice judgments. E.g., Beattie
v. Fimschild, 394 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) ("[The Michigan Court of Appeals] has rejected the argument
that a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is negligence per se, in favor of the proposition that a code
violation is rebuttable evidence of malpractice."). '
128. PATrERSON & MErZLOFF, supra note 126, § 2.01 ("[The professional rules] have not been entirely successful.
They have not, for example, been vigorously enforced."); Professors Patterson and Metzloff also state:
[The successor ABA codes have not kept pace with the times. The paradox is that even as official ABA
policy continues to be to limit the codes of ethics to a disciplinary function, they must compete with other
rules from other sources governing the lawyer's conduct. The irony is that having led the way in showing
the importance of the ethical conduct of lawyers, the ABA has also shown that the topic is too important
to be left to lawyers alone.
L. § 2.01.
In fact, this alleged inaptitude of the legal profession to regulate itself has caused many state officials to call for federal
or local regulation of the legal profession. Keatinge et al., supra note 10, at 458 ("Congress and federal regulatory agencies
[are] attempt[ing] to ensure the accountability of professionals."). Ironically, the advent of LLP law firms, by casting
further doubt on the legal profession's ability to serve the public's needs, might make the state's involvement in regulating
the conduct of lawyers more likely than ever before.
129. See Calabresi, supra note 81; Coase, supra note 81.
130. Coase, supra note 81, at 17-28.
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party can prevent loss more efficiently, society is better off assigning liability to that
party. The principle became invaluable to legal economists advocating proper cost-
shifting in tort law.' Calabresi, who published a tidal wave of scholarship following his
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts,3 2 summarized in a 1971 article
the loss prevention principle which he had engendered a decade earlier:
(1) [E]conomic efficiency standing alone would dictate that set of entitlements which
favors knowledgeable choices between social benefits and the social costs of obtaining
them, and between social costs and the social costs of avoiding them; (2) [Tlhis implies,
in the absence of certainty as to whether a benefit is worth its costs to society, that the
cost should be put on the party or activity best located to make such a cost-benefit
analysis; (3) [I]n particular contexts like accidents or pollution this suggests putting
costs on the party or activity which can most cheaply avoid them; (4) [I]n the absence
of certainty as to who that party or activity is, the costs should be put on the party or
activity which can with the lowest transaction costs act in the market to correct an error
in entitlements by inducing the party who can avoid social costs most cheaply to do
so.
13 3
As Calabresi explains, while the deterrence goal of tort law may well be served by
making a party liable for the cost of an accident, the goal of loss prevention requires that
liability rest with the party who can most efficiently avoid the accident. As this Part
argues, law firms are far more capable of preventing the occurrence of malpractice than
clients, and are, therefore, under the loss prevention principle, the most appropriate
bearers of liability.
B. The Shift in Malpractice Costs Caused by a Law Firm's
General Partnership-to-LLP Conversion
In a general partnership, a partner is personally liable for the debts and obligations of
the law firm, including those of each of her partners. 3 4 Imagine that the partner
negligently handles a client's case, resulting in a malpractice judgment against the firm.
If the firm's insurance and assets are altogether insufficient to pay the judgment, the
personal assets of all partners, negligent and nonnegligent alike, are subject to collection
by the creditor.'
In an LLP firm no lawyer can be held personally liable unless she was involved in the
act of malpractice, either directly or in a supervisory capacity. 36 If the involved lawyer(s)
do not possess sufficient assets to pay a malpractice judgment once firm insurance and
assets are depleted, the "innocent lawyers" are protected 37 and the client will be
undercompensated.' 31 The client, not the law firm, must now respond to the specter of
131. LANDES & POsNERsupra note 82, at 7,31-53.
132. Calabresi, supra note 81.
133. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1096-97 (1972).
134. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(a) (1994); UNIF. PARTN HIP ACT § 15 (1914).
135. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(a) (1994); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15 (1914).
136. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 6132b, § 3.08(a) (West Supp. 1995).
137. Id.
138. This underinsurance scenario is more likely to occur under limited liability than unlimited liability. Reinier
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategiev and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L. 857, 868-69 (1984) ("[Tihe
personal liability of firm agents-and in particular, of managers and directors-can serve as a partial check on asset
insufficiency, that is, on the danger that undercapitalized corporations will abuse their limited assets to evade the
compensatory or deterrent policies of liability rules."); Leebron, .supra note 119, at 1584 ("Limited liability may be
inefficient because it allows enterprises to externalize costs and makes activities less risky to investors than to society as
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undercompensation. 39 As Parts III.C and III.D explain, clients are less capable of making
socially efficient efforts to prevent malpractice.
C. Law Firms as Malpractice Preventors
Law firms have a number of methods with which to effectively and efficiently prevent
malpractice. For instance, lawyers in a particular firm, both by virtue of physical
proximity to one another and their custom of practicing in groups, 40 can personally
monitor each other's acts.' 4' Members of a law firm are held by their profession to remain
schooled in competent legal representation. 42 Thus they are relatively well qualified to
observe and evaluate the practices of lawyers. Firms commonly enact organizational
"safety rules," such as requiring that two or more attorneys read every opinion letter. 43
Most firms have their new associates complete in-house training programs'44 and require
a whole."); see also Kraakman, supra, at 870.
139. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 91 ("Limited liability does not eliminate the risk ofbusiness failure
but rather shifts some of the risk to creditors.").
140. SAMUELSON, supra note 22, at 2:12-2:13.
141. Sykes, supra note 88, at 1246; Developments, supra note 88, at 1671. This practice is also consistent with
professional rules. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 cmt. (1994) ("To maintain the requisite
knowledge and skill, a lawyer should engage in continuing study and education. If a system of peer review has been
established, the lawyer should consider making use of it in appropriate circumstances.") (emphasis added).
The "position to prevent harm" argument has also been used to argue against limited liability in the corporate context
where a shareholder becomes closely involved in a venture, such as in a close corporation. When shareholders show an
intent to control the affairs of a corporation, it becomes less likely that shareholders will avoid personal liability for the
negligent acts of the corporation. A tradeoff emerges: limited liability versus personal control. Professor Bahls states:
While investors are often willing to risk their entire net worth to businesses they operate, investors, absent
limited liability, are not willing toinvest in businesses they do not operate or closely monitor.... Some
commentators have persuasively argued that less justification exists for limited liability of owners in
closely held businesses.... Courts, recognizing the lesser need to protect shareholders of closely held
corporations from liability, have applied the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil almost exclusively to
closely held corporations.
Bahls, supra note 30, at 56-57; see also I 'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 75, § 2.04 ("[C]ourts not uncommonly
disregard the separate personality of a close corporation and impose personal liability on the shareholders for corporate
contracts or torts."); Halper et al., supra note 74, at 148 ("[A] limited liability regime will, in many cases, create
incentives for owners to exploit a moral hazard and transfer uncompensated business risk to creditors, thus inducing costly
attempts by creditors to reduce these risks.'); Hanmann & Kraakman, supra note 74, at 1882 ("The most familiar
inefficiency created by limited liability is the incentive it provides for the shareholders to direct the [closely held]
corporation to spend too little on precautions to avoid accidents"); Hilliman, supra note 75, at 486. Specifically, Professor
Hillman states:
[Ilt is necessary to consider how and why active involvement with a finn may be relevant to the issue of limited
liability. Again, considerjust a few possibilities:
Active participation reduces monitoring costs, and therefore the need for limited liability, because shareholders
are on the scene and may watch the activities of their co-owners.
Active participstion, when tied with a substantial investment, reduces the need for limited liability because the
shareholder may not have the same diversification objectives as the passive investor in the publicly held firm.
Active participation may mislead third parties into thinking that owner/managers stand behind the commitments
of their finns.
Or, active participation justifies unlimited liability because the power to control carries with it the responsibility
for the consequences of the exercise of control.
Id.; see also SHAvELL, supra note 20, at 176 ("[Close corporation] shareholders are more likely to have the requisite
knowledge and, if personally liable, the desire to watch over the corporation's activities.').
142. PATIERSON & MEzLOFF, supra note 126, § 5.01.
143. DICKERSON, supra note 28, at 80.
144. See William H. Fortume & Dulaney O'Roark, RiskMonagemenlforLayers, 45 S.C.L. REV. 617, 631-37 (1994).
Orientational education for lawyers is also encouraged by professional requirements. The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct state:
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
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older attorneys to complete continuing education and competency refresher courses. 45
Firms often devote time and resources toward the internal appointment of supervisory
partners. 4 6 Many firms establish committees to monitor the firm's malpractice risk or
appoint a loss prevention partner. 47 Some have gone as far as to retain full-time counsel
for this purpose.' 4' The ongoing computer revolution allows lawyers to accomplish a
number of tasks more efficiently, such as tracking procedural deadlines, reviewing each
other's work, and billing clients. 4 9 Additionally, malpractice records undoubtedly play
a role in a firm's selection (or nonselection) of its associates for partnership positions.'10
In all of these examples, the law firm can take advntage of its members' shared
physical proximity, professional skills, work schedules, and financial resources to
establish efficient and effective checks against the occurrence of malpractice. Indeed,
there seem to be few entities as well-equipped as a law firm to effectively prevent the
malpractice of its own members.
D. Clients as Malpractice Preventors
Unlike law firms, clients usually have few methods with which to effectively prevent
legal malpractice. Clients usually lack either the physical proximity, the educational
skills, or the financial resources to find a good lawyer,' much less be an effective
watchdog for legal malpractice.'52 Clients usually cannot "comparison shop" among firms
according to the quality of their malpractice prevention practices, due to the client's lack
of expertise' and to restrictions on law practice advertising. 4 Thus, market forces
which might be helpful in other merchant consumer contexts 5' are unlikely to be of
assistance to the client in encouraging firms to engage in competition based on their
malpractice-prevention skills.
Of course, a few alternative prevention options exist for certain classes of clients. For
instance, corporate clients often employ internal staff attorneys who possess the requisite
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (1994).
145. See Fortune & O'Roark, supra note 144, at 631. Continuing education withinla firm is also encouraged by
professional requirements. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.1 (1994). The comment to Rule 5.1
states in part:
The measures required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) can depend on the
firm's structure and nature of its practice. In a small firm, informal supervision and occasional admonition
ordinarily might be sufficient. In a large finn, or in practice situations in which intensely difficult ethical
problems frequently arise, more elaborate procedures may be necessary.
Id. cmt.
146. See DICKERSON,supra note 28, at 81.
147. Fortune & O'Roark, supra note 144, at 631.
148. Jonathan M. Epstein, The In-House Ethics Advisor: Practical Benefitsfor the Modem Law Firm, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL EnHcs 1011, 1029 (1994) (arguing that each firm should have a person or persons responsible for establishing
procedures designed to minimize liability).
149. Braithwaite, supra note 118, at 1129-33, 1144-51; Klemens, supra note 118, at 86.
150. See generally SAMUELSON, supra note 22, § 2.3A.3, at 3:45 (noting modem law firms' evaluation and promotion
of members based on demonstrated competence).
151. See Linda Morton, Finding a Suitable Lawyer: Why Consumers Can "t Always Get What They Want and What
the Legal Profession Should Do About It, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (1992).
152. This explains why legal malpractice plaintiffs generally need a lawyer to serve as an expert witness to testify that
particular conduct by the defendant-lawyer was negligent. STEIN, supra note 101, at 129-33.
153. Morton, supra note 151, at 284-86.
154. Id. at 296-308.
155. Clients have demonstrated some degree of market influence by successfilly demanding changes in lawyer
services in the area of alternative billing methods. See N. Scott Murphy, The Billable Hour, IND. BUS. MAG., May 1994,
at 37.
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skills and time to monitor the actions of the corporation's outside counsel. However,
inside counsel suffers the disadvantage of monitoring from outside the work environment
of the law firm's attorneys; by virtue of their lack of proximity, they seem inferior in
their ability to efficiently or effectively monitor the professional behavior of the firm's
members.'5 6 Another option for some clients is to obtain a personal guarantee from the
partners for the firm's services.'17 However, the only clients with a personal-guarantee
option at their disposal are those who possess sufficient bargaining power to obtain it.
This limits personal guarantees to clients who comprise a substantial portion of the law
firm's business. Few clients possess such power. Even assuming arguendo that firm
guarantees were available to all clients, such guarantees never give clients any more
malpractice protection than that provided by the default rule of unlimited liability in a
general partnership. This rule in effect requires all partners to pledge their entire
personal worth in the event of any incident of malpractice by a particular partner. 5
Realistically, the vast majority of clients do not have the option of employing advisory
counsel or obtaining a firm's guarantee to discourage the occurrence of malpractice.
Furthermore, even clients who obtain advisory counsel or firm guarantees experience far
greater transaction costs than law firms do in achieving the same level of malpractice
prevention.5 9
Most clients lack either the resources to recognize malpractice, or sufficient market
power to induce firms to practice additional malpractice avoidance. Though corporate and
wealthy clients can often encourage malpractice avoidance through outside monitoring
and personal guarantees, such options are usually less effective and always more
expensive than options available to law firms. Moreover, as a matter of fairness, these
options are not available to all clients, thereby potentially creating an unlevel playing
field for private and poor consumers of legal services. The LLP firm, by transferring the
cost of underinsured malpractice to clients, shifts the burden of avoiding malpractice to
less capable loss preventors.
156. Robert E. Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64
IND. LJ. 479,510-19 (1989).
157. See Easterbrook & Fische!, supra note 13, at 113 ("Alternatively, the creditor could ask for prepayment, personal
guarantees, or other security.").
The issue of client-firm bargaining also raises the question of whether a malpractice claimant qualifies as a breach of
contract creditor or an involuntary tort creditor. Logically, a law firm's contract creditors, such as an office landlord, can
factor the risk of nonpayment by the firm through charging higher rates and investigating the firm's creditworthiness. See
Hansman & Kraakman, supra note 74, at 1919 ("Limited liability for contractual debts simply permits the owners and
creditors of a finn to allocate the risks of the enterprise between themselves in whatever fashion is most efficient."). This
is not the case for involuntary tort creditors. Id at 1919-20; see Leebron, supra note 119, at 1601 ("[Allmost every
commentator has paused to note that limited liability cannot be satisfactorily justified for tort victims ('involuntary
creditors') and then moved on as though there is nothing to do about this unfortunate wrinkle in the economic perfection
of the law." (footnote omitted)).
Do malpractice victims, having had a contractual relationship with the firm prior to the injury, qualify as involuntary
creditors? The conclusion of most scholars is that malpractice victims are involuntary creditors because of their inability
to contract effectively according to the risk of default by a law firm, due to a lack of foreseability of the harm, a lack of
expertise, and a lack of bargaining power. SHAVEU, supra note 20, § 3.2.3 ('customers' knowledge of the quality of most
professional services (medical, legal, architectural) is... limited"). Professors Hansmann and Kraakman state specifically:
Tort victims, unlike contract creditors, cannot assess the potential credit-worthiness of a corporation
before they are injured, much less insist on compensation for bearing the risk that they will suffer harms
that the corporation's assets are insufficient to cover. Consequently, limited liability in tort permits the
firm's owners to determine unilaterally how much of their property will be exposed to potential tort
claims, thereby inviting opportunism and inefficiency.
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 74, at 1921. For further discussion, see Leebron, supra note 119, at 1601 n.1 14.
158. UNIF. PARTNERS5UP AcT § 306(a) (1994); UNIF. PARTNERSHMP ACT § 15 (1914).
159. Developments, supra note 88, at 1671.
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E. Response to the Malpractice Prevention Problem
LLP advocates might respond to the malpractice prevention problem by arguing that,
under loss prevention principles, subjecting the negligent partner alone to personal
liability is a better loss prevention rule. 6 Negligent partners are better loss preventors
than "innocent" partners because they are in a better position to make cost-effective
decisions to prevent malpractice. The negligent lawyer, as direct counsel to the client, is
well situated in physical proximity and professional knowledge to take preventive steps
to avoid malpractice. 6 In such a position, the negligent lawyer deserves the greatest
possible incentive to prevent loss to the client. Accordingly, she should be held solely
liable for compensating the injured client for any underinsured malpractice claim.
The problem with this argument is that it compares the loss-preventing abilities of the
wrong people; namely, it counterpoises the negligent lawyer against her uninvolved
partners, rather than the uninvolved partners against the client victimized by malpractice.
LLP advocates note that the LLP form insulates uninvolved partners from the negligent
acts of other partners. This seems to assign more liability, and thus a heightened loss-
prevention incentive, to the negligent partner in an LLP law firm. At first blush, the
policy of assigning liability to the party most capable of preventing harm seems better
served by the LLP than by the general partnership. Realistically, however, many general
partnership agreements contractually alter the relative contribution duties of partners
from the general rule of equal sharing of debts.'62 Many agreements deny each partner
indemnification by fellow partners for the partner's negligent acts, thus requiring a
negligent partner to suffer alone the cost of an adverse malpractice claim once firm
insurance and assets are exhausted. 6 Only after the negligent partner's personal assets
are exhausted and the malpractice judgment creditor seeks compensation from an
innocent partner, will contribution occur from other partners.'" In other words, under
either the LLP or general partnership rule, the negligent partner will pay first once firm
insurance and assets are used up. The remaining difference between the LLP and general
partnership is that LLP firms do not offer malpractice creditors the personal assets of the
uninvolved partners as a payment source once a negligent partner's assets are gone.
Since LLP statutes often fail to shift underinsured malpractice costs from negligent
partners to nonnegligent partners (due to the indemnity provisions of many general
partnership agreements), comparing their relative loss prevention skills becomes less
relevant in selecting an appropriate rule of liability. Since LLPs will always shift
underinsured malpractice costs from nonnegligent partners to clients, it becomes highly
relevant to compare the preventive abilities of "uninvolved" partners to firm clients. In
most cases, a negligent lawyer's fellow partners will be far more able than the client to
make cost-effective decisions to prevent malpractice making them better parties to which
to assign liability.'65
160. This argument is made by many lawyers who object to unlimited liability. See Orey, supra note I, at 81;
Weidlich, supra note 2, at 1.
161. See supra part II.C.
162. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 401(b) (1994); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a) (1914).
163. See MELvIN A. EISENBERG, Form ofPartnership Agreement: §15.06 Indemnification, in CORPORATIONS AND
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: STATUTES, RULES, MATERIALS, AND FORMS 10 (1994).
164. Id.
165. See supra part I.C.
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IV. How LLP LAW FIRMS WILL SHIFT MALPRACTICE COSTS
TO INEFFICIENT Loss SPREADERS
Part II of this Note argued that the LLP form will breed malpractice by discouraging
members of law partnerships from monitoring co-partners. Part III argued that the LLP
form shifts the costs of underinsured malpractice from law firms to clients, despite the
relative inability of clients to prevent legal malpractice. This Part will argue that LLPs
not only shift malpractice costs onto less capable loss preventors, but also shift
malpractice costs onto less efficient loss spreaders.
A. The Loss-Spreading Principle
Like deterrence and loss prevention, the principle of loss spreading owes much of its
development to Legal Economics, aided by the works of Guido Calabresi, Ronald Coase,
and Richard Posner.' While deterrence and loss prevention assign liability to encourage
people to efficiently avoid accidents, the principle of loss spreading assigns liability for
accidents which cannot be efficiently avoided. 6 " As Professors Fowler Harper, James
Fleming, Jr., and Oscar Gray explain: "Accidents and their consequences today pose a
serious social problem. Its solution calls for (1) measuresthat will cut down accidents;
and (2) measures that will minimize the bad effects of those accidents that do happen."'
Loss spreading guides tort law in achieving goal number (2) by assigning liability for a
loss to the party that can most efficiently distribute it to other loss bearers. 69 Professor
Gary Schwartz recently described three likely characteristics of an efficient loss spreader:
The defendant may have loss-bearing abilities for a number of reasons. First, the
defendant might be a wealthy entity with deep-pocket attributes. Second, the defendant
may be a commercial organization that can respond to liability in a loss-spreading way
by marginally raising the prices that it charges to large numbers of customers. Third, the
defendant, so long as he is minimally solvent, can effectively spread the loss through
the purchase of liability insurance.1'7
In general, then, the party who will most cheaply achieve risk minimization, or "risk
neutrality," will be the one who has the greatest economic resources or who can spread
the loss most effectively, either as a result of the party's status as a commercial enterprise
or its ability to obtain insurance.'
The goals of loss spreading are not limited to merely distributing losses to the
maximum number of loss bearers. The law will also consider a particular audience of loss
bearers to determine whether, as a normative matter, they should be expected to pay the
166. See Calabresi, supra note 81; Coase, supra note 81; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 83; Posner,
Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, supra note 83.
167. LANDES &POSNER, supra note 82, at 13 ("A]lways bear[] in mind that the economic function of tort law is to
optimize rather than minimize the number of accidents.").
168.3 FOWLER V. HARPERErAL., T1ELAWOF TOMr § 11.5 (2d ed. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
169. James G. Fleming, The Role of Negligence in Modem Tori Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 815, 837 (1967); Schwartz,
supra note 100, at 359-60.
170. Schwartz, supra note 100, at 359-60 (footnote omitted).
171. In the professional practice context similar observations have been made about the medical profession. See Glen
0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, 49 LAW &
CoNrEa. PROBS. 173, 181 (1986) (discussing efficient allocation in the context of medical malpractice) ("If there is an
economic preference for the (doctor], it must rest on the intuition that physicians are better able than patients either to
reduce accident costs or distribute them eliciently. . .'. "(emphasis added)).
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costs incurred by the loss transfer. In his 1967 article, The Role of Negligence, Professor
Fleming stated the principle beautifully:
By far the most pervasive catalyst of loss spreading has proved to be liability insurance;
for it has made it possible to gear conventional rules of law, without any radical reform
of those rules themselves, to the changing needs of a technological society with rising
living standards and ever growing expectations of physical and social security. Instead
of adverse judgments having a crushing effect on the hapless defendant, his liability
insurance at once affords him protection against having to bear the impost
singlehandedly and "pools" the risk among all premium payers. Better still, to the extent
that tort liability falls on the enterprise as a whole the cost is passed on to its customers
as a negligible fraction of the price they are charged for its products.'
The manufacturing industry offers a common example of this principle. If a defective car
injures a car owner and results in a successful products liability suit, the manufacturer
will incur a loss by paying the plaintiff's judgment. But the manufacturer, by raising
automobile prices, can pass that loss along to future car buyers. Not only does this spread
loss as a positive matter (because a loss gets distributed among a larger group of loss
bearers), but it is serves the principle of loss spreading as a normative matter because
many of the loss bearers are car buyers who benefited from cheaper automobile prices
that the manufacturer was able to charge because of costs saved in making a defective car,
such as inspection costs.' 3
B. The Shift in Malpractice Costs Caused by a Law Firm's
General Partnership-to-LLP Conversion
In a general partnership, a partner is personally liable for the debts and obligations of
the law firm, including those of each of her partners. 74 If firm insurance and assets are
insufficient to pay a malpractice judgment, the personal assets of all other partners are
subject to collection by the malpractice creditor.' An LLP firm, however, shields its
partners from vicarious liability for the negligent partner's acts, 76 and thus, any
underinsured malpractice claims which exceed the negligent partner's assets will go
uncompensated.'" The client must shoulder the burden of any excess malpractice. As
Parts IV.C and IV.D explain, clients are improper subjects upon which to impose
responsibility for spreading malpractice costs.
172. Fleming, supra note 169, at 837.
173. See id. (setting forth this economic theory).
174. UNrF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 306(a) (1994); UNIF. PARrTNERSInP ACT § 15 (1914).
175. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 306(a) (1994); UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15 (1914).
176. TEx. REv. Ctv. STAT. ANN., art. 6132b, § 3.08 (West Supp. 1995).
177. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 13, at 91 ("Limited liability does not eliminate the risk of business failure
but rather shifts some of the risk to creditors.").
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C. Law Firms as Loss Spreaders
Though much of legal malpractice can be avoided through preventive techniques,17
some degree of malpractice inevitably occurs.17 Law firms, however, are able to offset
the burden of malpractice claims through loss spreading.
Law firms commonly spread losses incurred through malpractice claims by securing
malpractice insurance. ° Some firms choose to spread losses through self-insurance,
either by maintaining a capital reserve to be used in paying malpractice judgments or by
merely relying upon firm assets and the personal assets of partners to cover the costs of
any malpractice judgment."" In any case, the costs of the client's loss (first "spread"
across the shared partnership assets of the firm's partners) will presumably be spread
among a larger group of individuals, namely the firm's clients, through higher legal
fees."' Tort law prefers this result, both because the loss is distributed across a larger
number of loss bearers and because those loss bearers are parties who more likely
benefited from lower malpractice costs which the law firm was able to charge by
providing negligent legal services.13
D. Clients as Loss Spreaders
Clients have a more limited range of options for spreading the costs of malpractice.
Legal malpractice insurers generally do not offer first-party coverage; that is, coverage
which would insure clients against legal malpractice."" In addition, unlike law firms
whose partnership form spreads the initial costs of any underinsured malpractice
judgments across the personal assets of its partners,' if a client is a private individual,
no loss spreading can occur; the client's only available option is to self-insure. 1t 6
In the case of a commercial client, the cost of underinsured malpractice claims can be
passed onto customers. For instance, if outside counsel for Microsoft Corporation
commits malpractice and underpays the claim, Microsoft can spread its loss across a
larger group of loss bearers, namely computer software consumers. But as explained,
178. See part ElI.C.
179. Fredric L. Goldfein, Legal Malpractice Insurance, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1285, 1285, 1298 (1988); see Gary T.
Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377,399 (1994)
("Despite the existence of an extensive [medical] malpractice liability system, malpractice seems to be committed quite
frequently.').
180. Goldfein, supra note 179, at 1285-86; Fortune & O'Roark, supra note 144, at 823-33 (discussing history of
lawyers moving from "going bare" to recognizing the "obvious" need for insurance).
181. Fortune & O'Roark, supra note 144, at 633-34 (discussing the success of "captive" or "bar-related" insurance
companies, entities wholly owned by those insured for the purpose of underwriting the insurance of its members); Priest,
supra note 102, at 1526-27 (discussing various self-insurance techniques chosen by professionals instead of malpractice
insurance).
182. See Roger J. Bulger & Victoria P. Rostow, Medical Professional Liability and the Delivery of Obstetrical Care,
6 J. CoNrEmp. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 81, 84 (1990) Oinling rising malpractice insurance premiums to rising fees in
obstetrical practice).
183. See Fleming, supra note 169, at 837-38.
184. See Chandra D. Lantz, Note, Triggering Coverage of Progressive Property Loss: Preserving the Distinctions
Between First- and Third-Parny Insurance Policies, 35 WM. & MARY L.REv. 1801,1808-16 (explaining that "[t]hird-party
coverage insures against liability to a third party that has suffered loss as a result of the insured's actions," while "[ln
contrast, first-pirty policies seek to indemnify for losses personally suffered by the insured").
185. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP Act § 306(a) (1994); UNIF. PART'ERHIP ACT § 15 (1914).
186. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436,441 (1944) (rraynor, J., concurring) ("The cost of an injury
... may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured
by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.").
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transfer of loss to a larger group of loss bearers is only one goal of loss spreading.1 7
Another important goal of loss spreading is the transfer of loss to an appropriate group
of loss bearers."" A strong argument can be made that the clients of Microsoft's lawfirm,
rather than computer software consumers, are the more appropriate group of loss bearers
because they benefited from cheaper legal fees which the law firm charged due to costs
the firm saved in practicing law negligently as opposed to nonnegligently.
A law firm is a more appropriate loss spreader of malpractice costs, because it is more
often capable of spreading malpractice costs across a larger group of loss bearers. More
importantly, law firms are better loss spreaders because they are able to spread
malpractice costs across the group of loss bearers who most likely benefited from the
firm's malpractice.
E. Response to the Loss-Spreading Problem
LLP advocates might respond to the loss-spreading problem by arguing that under
unlimited liability, firms simply are unable to obtain the amount of insurance necessary
to sufficiently spread losses, which might bankrupt underinsured firms or force them to
refuse to offer certain types of legal services or to represent certain clients." 9 But while
some law firms have found themselves unable to obtain insurance,"9 insurance has grown
more available in recent years as premiums have leveled off and various "bar-based" and
"captive" insurance programs have gained prominence.' 9' In any event, insurance is at
least available to law firms, while it is generally unavailable to clients, making law firms
more practical subjects for malpractice liability.' In addition, firms have the option of
either raising fees or refusing to perform certain high-risk services. 93 If consumers of
legal services are unwilling to pay the increase in fees necessary to enable law firms to
spread malpractice costs, then perhaps the social costs of having such services outweigh
their social benefits.1
94
187. See supra part IV.A.
188. Fleming, supra note 169, at 837.
189. Physicians make a similar argument, claiming to practice defensive medicine in lieu of available medical
malpractice insurance. Bulger & Rostow, supra note 182, at 83 ("Obstetricians and family physicians increasingly report
that they are eliminating the obstetrical portion of their practices or reducing the provision of care to patients who are
identifiably at high risk because they fear being sued and do not want to accept the high cost of liability insurance."
(footnote omitted)). "
190. Goldfein, supra note 179, at 1292-93 (discussing rising costs and shrinking availability of legal malpractice
insurance); Geyelin, supra note 122, at B3 ("[L]iability insurance, particularly for smaller firms, may cover only a fraction
of the amount of money at stake in a big transaction.").
191. Fortune & O'Roark, supra note 144, at 633-34.
192. The unavailability of first-party legal malpractice insurance for clients--that is, protection against malpractice
suffered-is in part due to the difficulty of predicting damages likely to be suffered. This unpredictability affects all first-
party insurance policies. See Lantz, supra note 184, at 1808-16. Specifically, Lantz states:
In general, a first-party insured is able to predict his maximum losses and potential risks during a particular policy
period. An insured protected by a liability policy, however, can at best make an educated guess as to potential losses
and risks. Whereas direct damage losses can never exceed the value of the insured property, liability claims can be
virtually unlimited. As a result, the spectrum of risks and degree of uncertainty is much greater in the context of
third-party insurance coverage.
Id. at 1814 (footnotes omitted).
193. Curtis, supra note 91, at 987-88 ("In many cases, [insurers] have refused to write coverage for claims brought
by regulatory agencies, even refusing coverage entirely for thrift representation. These insurance company policies in turn
affect what kind of clients law firms are willing to represent.').
194. See Leebron, supra note 119, at 1577-78 ('n these circumstances, however, unlimited liability would serve a
valuable regulatory function.'); Developments, supra note 88, at 1668 (acknowledging "the social benefit of forcing
incompetent lawyers into bankruptcy"); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 74, at 1888.
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CONCLUSION
A substantial change in a law partner's liability occurs upon conversion from general
partnership to LLP status. Many law firm partners have cheered the arrival of this "best
of all possible worlds.""19 With LLP statutes apparently more popular than past
nonpartnership forms, their negative effect, if any, will be all the greater upon society in
the aggregate. Whether state courts will involve themselves in the efforts of law firms to
shield personal assets from vicarious tort liability remains to be seen. As this Note has
argued, limited liability law partnerships entail three distinct public costs. First, limited
liability law partnerships will reduce malpractice deterrence among lawyers. Second, LLP
law firms will force clients into the role of malpractice preventors, a role for which they
are ill-equipped. Third, LLP law firms will impede the spreading of malpractice costs.
Courts should give pause before letting today's legislative obsession with legal
malpractice reform lead to deterrence, loss prevention, and loss spreading burdens that
may be too difficult for clients to bear.
195. VOLTAIRE, supra note 80, passim.
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